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China’s America Policy: Back to the Future 

by Thomas Fingar and David M. Lampton

US-China ties are worse than they have been since the early 1950s, and will likely deteriorate further unless both sides take steps neither is yet willing or able to. To achieve wary coexistence and productive cooperation requires a deeper understanding of China’s goals, fears and behavior. A good place to begin is by acknowledging that much of China’s American policy harkens back to earlier eras—an old mindset sacrificing growth to reduce vulnerability to external interference.  

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Defending Taiwan: But…What Are the Costs? 

by Rachel Metz and Erik Sand

So far, the public debate about the US government’s increasing commitment to defend Taiwan has largely neglected a systematic analysis of its costs, five of which are laid out here in order to equip the American people and policymakers with a more thorough framework to understand the highest-stakes foreign policy question of our time. 

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The Implications of Contemporary US-China

"Hypercompetition"

by Ian Bowers and Øystein Tunsjø 

Competition between the US and China is something fundamentally new. It is not rules-based, nor Cold War-style, nor akin to pre-WWII great-power competition. The authors apply a business strategy concept of “hypercompetition” to the relationshipexplaining how dynamic factors such as interdependence and rapid technological development contribute to constant disequilibriumand identify four key areas of strategic policy flexibility needed to manage the instability. 

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De-Risking Is Not Enough: Tech Denial Toward

China Is Needed 

by Brad Glosserman 

The US and its partners should embrace a more aggressive and comprehensive policy of new and emerging technology denial toward China. Although the Biden administration initially seemed to understand this, strategic trade controls have reverted to their Cold War focus on military applications. The new and emerging technology race is too close and the stakes too high for business-as-usual economic integration. 

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Modernizing Deterrence

Comprehensive Extended Deterrence with the

ROK: Integrating Economics 

by Sung-han Kim and Hyun Ji Rim  

Building on the April 2023 Washington Declaration that strengthened the US extended nuclear deterrence mechanism, South Korea’s former National Security Adviser coauthors a call to employ “extended economic deterrence.” By combining the two elements, the authors propose elevating the concept of “comprehensive extended deterrence” to a main pillar of the US-ROK alliance, and how best to shore it up.  

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A Tripolar Nuclear World: Challenges to Strategic

Stability 

by Robert Litwak

The near-collapse of treaty-based arms control, emergence of new domains and technologies, and an arising two-peer nuclear challenge are exacerbating both arms race instability and crisis instability. In the new tripolar nuclear world, these risks cannot be resolved, but they can be managedbut only if the three powers acknowledge their mutual interest in halting a destabilizing spiral into unconstrained competition. 

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The Return of Crisis Diplomacy: Ukraine, Taiwan and Beyond 

by Ron Gurantz

As competition with China and Russia intensifies, crisis diplomacy will likely continue to reemerge as a major concern. If war does occur in a place like Taiwan, crisis diplomacy could determine whether allies and the public support military action. In competing to control the narrative, the US will want to remember lessons from Ukraine, but the possibility of direct American intervention means it will also want to revisit the lessons of Cuba. 

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Provocations

Putting the Trans-Pacific Partnership Back on the

Table 

by David H. Bearce and Seungbin Park 

Without the Trans-Pacific Partnership or its successor, the CPTPP, the US lacks a viable tactical instrument to execute its Indo-Pacific pivot. New survey data, however, shows that anticipated domestic opposition may be reduced, even among partisan Republicans and citizens without a college degree, by reframing benefits as dealing with inflation and countering a rising China. 

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India’s A La Carte Minilateralism: AUKUS and the Quad 

by Sarah Tzinieris, Rishika Chauhan and Eirini Athanasiadou 

Minilateral frameworks like AUKUS and the Quad are problematic for India. Delhi wants to avoid provoking Beijing’s ire, driving it closer to Russia and Pakistan and reducing trade, while also being concerned with its own security and shaping a just, inclusive regional order in ways which will promote its status and protect its identity as a regional networker. Taken together, Washington cannot assume Delhi’s long-term support, especially for AUKUS but even for the Quad. 

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Behind the Headlines

Insights from previous issues

America's Role in a Post-American Middle East

by Dalia Dassa Kaye

Perceptions of whether the United States is “staying or going” in the Middle East are
increasingly divorced from realities on the ground. The US is both engaged in the region and seeking to reduce its direct commitments, but American regional predominance, if it ever really existed, is certainly now over. So, what is the American role in a post-American Middle East? From our Spring 2022 issue.

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How Putin's Regime Survivalism Drives Russian Aggression

by Aleksandar Matovski 

Geopolitical and ideological motivations cannot explain the timing, among other factors, of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Instead, regime preservation is both often overlooked in Western debates and has implications for the Kremlin’s future behavior, escalation risks, negotiation strategies, and war objectives. Ignoring this self-preservation motive could have catastrophic consequences. From our Summer 2023 issue. 

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Russia’s Failed Nuclear Coercion Against Ukraine

by Anna Clara Arndt, Liviu Horovitz and Michal Onderco

Kyiv itself was not the main target of Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric…until September 2022. Just a few weeks later, Russia suddenly stepped it back. Why? The authors argue that these short-lived attempts failed because of Moscow’s decision-making pathologies which led to three errors. But what do they teach us about nuclear deterrence more broadly?From our Fall 2023 issue. 

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China’s Potential Lessons from Ukraine for Conflict over Taiwan

by M. Taylor Fravel

What political, military and economic lessons might China be learning from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the global responses to the war? How might these assessments influence China’s decision to use force against Taiwan? And given these lessons, what other actions might lead Beijing to rely on the use of force against the island?

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China's Economic Statecraft: Lessons Learned from Ukraine

by Audrye Wong

Relative to Moscow, Beijing is arguably both more sensitive to and more resilient against US economic pressure. While China is vulnerable to US financial power, and is likely to remain so for the near to medium term, Beijing is likely to take three steps, based on its lessons drawn from the war in Ukraine, to attempt to weaken US and allied leverage in any potential future crisis. From our Spring 2023 issue. 

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Still Getting Asia Wrong: No “Contain China” Coalition Exists

by David C. Kang

For decades, scholars have been claiming that Chinese power is, will, or should cause East Asian countries to balance it. Yet, these countries have steadily reduced their proportional defense spending, are increasing their economic relations with China, and are building regional multilateral institutions with Beijing. US strategy needs to be rethought: there is little evidence any East Asian country would join even an incipient containment coalition against China. From our Winter 2023 issue.

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