

U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress America and its Alternatives

America is an exceptional nation, but not when it comes to the wave of nationalism sweeping the globe. Across multiple continents, leaders and polities are pushing back against globalization and integration; they are reasserting national sovereignty as a bulwark against international tumult. In the United States, this nationalist resurgence has manifested in a sharp and potentially existential challenge to the internationalist project that has animated U.S. grand strategy since World War II.

For nearly 75 years, U.S. foreign policy has emphasized securing American interests through the leadership of an open, stable, and integrated global community, one in which Washington bears the heaviest burdens in exchange for enormous benefits. But today, American internationalism is under fire. The 2016 presidential election saw strident critiques of globalization, alliances, multilateralism, and other components of America's post-war project. The triumph of Donald Trump brought to power a candidate who espoused a stark, pugilistic nationalism. Whether America is decisively turning away from its post-war grand strategic tradition remains uncertain; what is clear is that American grand strategy will have a more nationalistic flavor in years to come.

Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at John's Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He is the author of *What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (2014) and *Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order* (2016). He can be reached at hal.brands@jhu.edu, and followed on Twitter @HalBrands1.

Copyright © 2017 The Elliott School of International Affairs
The Washington Quarterly • 40:1 pp. 73–94
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302740>

But what might a more nationalistic grand strategy entail? One model is “Fortress America”—a hardline, nearly zero-sum approach that would actively roll back the post-war international order and feature heavy doses of unilateralism and latter-day isolationism. This model is dark but no longer inconceivable: the Trump administration has flirted with a Fortress America approach in its rhetoric and some early policies. Yet there is also another model, a more benign version of American nationalism that might be thought of as internationalism with a nationalist accent. This approach would not fundamentally dismantle the post-war international order; the emphasis would be on securing better deals, more evenly distributing burdens, and enhancing America’s relative position within that order. The first model represents the path to superpower suicide and a far uglier, disordered world; the second would involve some real drawbacks and disruption, but could perhaps help sustain an internationalist project—and global order—that are presently under strain.

Understanding American Internationalism

America’s post-war project has never represented a rejection of nationalism—nationalism, in this instance, being the pursuit of a foreign policy that aggressively prioritizes America’s own national interests. Rather, America’s post-war project has simply pursued U.S. national interests via internationalist means.

For U.S. policymakers, World War II showed that the global environment had become fundamentally interdependent in both economic and security terms. It thereby compelled U.S. policymakers to move beyond a narrow conception of U.S. interests, and to protect those interests by constructing an overarching international system in which America could be prosperous and secure. During the post-war decades, the United States undertook to lead an open and prosperous global economy, to underwrite stability and security in key regions, to advance liberal ideals such as democracy and human rights, and to embed U.S. primacy in a variety of multilateral institutions. This internationalist order-building project, Princeton professor G. John Ikenberry has written, was “the most ambitious and far-reaching ... the world had yet seen.”¹

This project was never cost-free, of course. The United States made military expenditures far in excess of what would have been required simply to defend American territory; it tolerated some free-riding by allies from Western Europe to the Western Pacific; it bore some of the heaviest burdens in responding to transgressions of the international order from the Korean War to the Persian Gulf War and beyond. Likewise, Washington’s leadership of the international economy meant accepting a degree of economic discrimination by countries that exploited open U.S. markets without fully opening their own; it also required accepting

responsibility for stabilizing and lubricating the international economy, with all the exertions those tasks entailed. Participating in international institutions—from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the United Nations (UN)—meant accepting some multilateral constraints on how the United States could wield its unmatched power. The burdens and frustrations of American internationalism have often been exaggerated, but they have never been illusory.

What made the bargain worthwhile was that the United States also reaped great benefits. There have been broad if somewhat amorphous benefits, such as the security and well-being that have come from living in a world that has avoided both great-power war and global depression for generations. There have also been narrower benefits—the immense influence that the United States wields in all the world's key regions; the checks it has been able to impose on nuclear proliferation and other threats; the extraordinary international cooperation it has secured in pursuing its own foreign policy priorities, from combating communism during the Cold War to terrorism today. On the economic front, too, economists generally agree that the pursuit of free trade and globalization has made the United States (and the world) far richer than it otherwise would have been—in fact, Washington has frequently translated its position of international leadership into an advantage in trade and other economic negotiations.²

American internationalism, then, has never been a matter of charity. It has simply represented an enlightened, positive-sum form of nationalism based on the idea that the United States can best achieve its own security and prosperity by helping others become secure and prosperous. Since World War II, there has been a broad political consensus that the benefits of this internationalist project were well worth the costs. Now, however, that consensus appears to be fraying, as a rawer, more atavistic form of American nationalism reappears.

The burdens of American internationalism have been exaggerated, but they are not illusory.

Nationalism Resurgent

The 2016 presidential election will likely loom large for future historians studying the patterns of American foreign policy. A word of caution here—one should not over-interpret the result of that election as proof that the U.S. public has decisively reverted to the narrower nationalism and isolationism of the pre-World War II years. After all, issues of trade and terrorism aside, foreign policy played a relatively small role in the election, and the candidate who won the popular vote—Hillary Clinton—espoused a foreign policy vision that was largely aligned

with U.S. globalism.³ Moreover, opinion polls from 2015–2016 indicate that public support for key aspects of American internationalism—including alliances and free trade—remains close to post-war and post-Cold War averages. Seventy-seven percent of Americans thought that being a member of NATO was good for the United States in mid-2016; polls taken in late 2016 showed majority support for globalization and even the much-maligned Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact.⁴ And although Donald Trump did win the election, he hardly carried a great mass of GOP isolationists into Congress on his coattails. One could plausibly conclude from all this that Trump’s election was a black-swan event, largely disconnected from U.S. public opinion on foreign policy.

Yet, there is also reason to see 2016 as an inflection point in America’s foreign relations. Concerns about the downsides of free-trade and globalization—particularly the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs and the increased vulnerability, economic and otherwise, that accompanies global integration—have been mounting for decades.⁵ Opinion polling aside, disillusion with other aspects of American internationalism has also been rising. It was not Donald Trump but then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who admonished the NATO allies in 2011 about the long-term consequences of unequal burden-sharing. “The blunt reality,” he said, “is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American body politic writ large—to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling ... to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.”⁶ And in the run-up to 2016, other signs of American world-weariness appeared. According to one survey conducted in 2013, 52 percent of Americans, the largest share in decades, believed that the country should “mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.”⁷

The 2016 election itself, moreover, was characterized by a striking degree of

The 2016 election was characterized by striking hostility toward America’s internationalist project.

hostility toward America’s internationalist project. On the left, Bernie Sanders railed against TPP, and won fervent favor among working-class voters, environmentalists, and other opponents of globalization. Hillary Clinton—who had energetically backed TPP while secretary of state—found Democratic opposition to the pact so severe that she repudiated that agreement during the primaries. Even accounting for the fact that skepticism toward free trade traditionally runs higher

among Democrats than Republicans, the election thus revealed a widespread feeling that globalization and U.S. leadership of an open international economy were not working particularly well for many American voters.⁸

And of course, Donald Trump won the election, after campaigning on the most stridently, confrontationally nationalist platform of any major party candidate in generations. He called TPP “a rape of our country,” condemned existing free-trade agreements, and promised to institute high tariffs and economic protectionism.⁹ He labeled NATO “obsolete” and suggested that key U.S. allies might be left to defend themselves.¹⁰ He proposed extreme measures to strengthen U.S. sovereignty and border control, and voiced a harsh skepticism of many of the international institutions and arrangements that Washington had itself helped create. He even revived the 1930s-era slogan “America First,” evoking a full-on rejection of the post-war international order and a return to prewar isolationism.¹¹

Trump thus evinced a remarkable hostility to core aspects of American internationalism—and was, at the very least, not punished for it by U.S. voters. Prior to Trump, every presidential candidate who had bucked the post-war internationalist tradition—Robert Taft, George McGovern, Pat Buchanan—had been turned back at the polls. But not this time. America now has a president who embraces a fiery, populist nationalism, and who has fundamentally challenged American internationalism. The question is thus not whether U.S. foreign policy will change during his administration, but how much?

Fortress America

Under one model, the change would be severe. “Fortress America” represents a hardline version of American nationalism, infused with strong elements of unilateralism and isolationism. It rests on a nearly zero-sum logic of global affairs—specifically, the idea that other countries have systematically exploited American largesse and openness for years, and that providing public goods or participating in multilateral regimes is a sucker’s bet for a self-interested superpower. It contends that the trend toward greater global integration has actually left America weaker and more vulnerable by undermining its sovereignty and its ability to defend itself from global upheaval, and that the active promotion of liberal values is a fruitless and quixotic quest. It holds that the United States should have—and be prepared aggressively to use—enormous military strengths, but that it should wield those strengths only to protect narrowly conceived national interests, as opposed to protecting allies or some broader conception of international security. Accordingly, this approach entails an explicit rejection of America’s positive-sum, internationalist project, and a reversion to more narrowly nationalistic policies that carry distinct echoes of the 1930s and even before.¹²

Elements of Fortress America

The central pillar of Fortress America is economic nationalism, and the idea, as President Trump remarked in his inaugural address, that “protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.”¹³ The United States would roll back its support for an open global economy by withdrawing from free-trade agreements such as TPP and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and imposing high tariffs to protect industries weakened by globalization. Washington would also operate outside of the World Trade Organization (WTO) process far more frequently, perhaps withdrawing from that organization altogether, and it would emphasize economic sovereignty and obtaining unilateral advantage over trade competitors such as China rather than upholding the global economic “rules of the road.” U.S. policy would severely penalize American corporations engaged in offshoring or outsourcing, perhaps through high border taxes, and feature inducements to “buy American” and “hire American.”¹⁴ Not least, Fortress America would seek to insulate the United States from global economic shocks—perhaps by pursuing a latter-day “Manhattan Project” for achieving “energy independence” through all-in bets on fracking and development of domestically sourced alternative energies.¹⁵

Second, the United States would pull back from U.S. alliances and the provision of global security and other global public goods on grounds that providing these goods simply encourages free-riding on American exertions. At a minimum, Washington would therefore demand far higher rents for the global services it currently provides. Saudi Arabia might be asked to supply, free of charge, a certain quantity of oil in exchange for the U.S. Navy protecting the Strait of Tiran; Japan might be pressured to make far higher economic payments to retain U.S. security guarantees. More significantly, America might simply quit providing “welfare for the rich.”¹⁶ It might terminate its military alliances, cease providing security of the commons, and revert to a narrower—and advocates would say, more self-interested—conception of national security and defense.

Third, and related, America would pursue a “muscular but aloof militarism”—an emphasis on building great military strength, but focused narrowly on the defense of the United States.¹⁷ The Pentagon would invest heavily in capabilities needed to deter, defeat, or punish attacks on the homeland or U.S. citizens—everything from enhanced missile defenses, to recapitalization of the nuclear triad, to special operations forces and other tools of counterterrorism. Yet, it would no longer emphasize a force posture or overseas presence associated with acting as a global constabulary and the primary provider of international security—unless it received far higher rents for its efforts. Post-war internationalists have wanted a military formidable enough to sustain global order; Fortress America would seek a military strong enough for America to be left alone.

Fourth, to facilitate this retraction of overseas commitments, U.S. officials would encourage devolution of responsibility to other powers. Washington would support authoritarian great powers such as Russia and China carving out greater spheres of influence, on grounds that preservation of order in Eastern Europe and East Asia should be their responsibility, not America's. Similarly, the United States might encourage nuclear proliferation by countries such as Japan, Germany, and South Korea, so that they could better meet their own security needs.¹⁸

Fifth, Fortress America would entail a “win and go home” approach to counter-terrorism. Fortress America does not imply passivity against pressing threats—quite the opposite. The United States would take stronger measures against jihadist groups, from deployment of large numbers of ground troops, to intensified bombing campaigns and acceptance of greatly increased civilian casualties, to embracing controversial measures such as extraordinary rendition, “black sites,” and torture. But after defeating such organizations, Washington would not pursue nation-building or stabilization missions, which are likely to prove costly and frustrating; it would disclaim any responsibility for improving governance in the greater Middle East. The emphasis, rather, would be on hardening homeland defenses and husbanding American capabilities—until the next attack occurred, at which point the cycle would start anew.

Sixth, and related to the previous point, the United States would essentially abandon human-rights and democracy promotion, by either military or non-military means. America cannot successfully export its values to foreign societies, the thinking goes, and such efforts simply waste resources better used at home. Washington should thus focus on securing tangible geopolitical and economic interests, including through amoral deal-cutting with authoritarian regimes, rather than pursuing amorphous “ideals” such as liberal democracy.¹⁹

Seventh, Fortress America would entail stringent measures to strengthen American sovereignty and shield the country from unsettling by-products of globalization. Building a wall along the Mexican border (and forcing Mexico to pay for it), deporting illegal immigrants *en masse*, restricting and perhaps banning entry of refugees and citizens of Muslim-majority countries, would all figure prominently in this approach. So might extreme homeland security measures, such as creation of a Muslim registry, designed to better keep tabs on “un-American” groups thought to pose a particular threat to internal security.

Eighth, and to enable much of the foregoing, Fortress America would seek to free America from the shackles of international law, international institutions, and multilateralism, on grounds that these arrangements too frequently inhibit the United States from fully exerting its unmatched power. Withdrawing from the UN (or simply knee-capping it through major funding cuts), as well as quitting multilateral treaties and legal regimes that

infringe upon U.S. sovereignty or constrain the aggressive pursuit of U.S. interests, would be central to this model.²⁰ And whereas post-war internationalism has placed a high premium on multilateral consultation and action, Fortress America would emphasize preserving Washington's freedom of action by making unilateralism—whether in counter-terrorism or any other arena—the approach of choice.

This description of Fortress America may initially seem like a caricature of

Fortress America may seem like a caricature of 1930s-era isolationism, but it is not implausible.

1930s-era isolationism, updated for the modern age. But it is not so implausible. After all, Donald Trump has at the very least flirted with virtually all of the ideas underlying Fortress America, and with many of its specific policies, too. We do not have to imagine having a president who has argued that America is being played for a sucker “by every nation in the world, virtually,” and who has derided America’s internationalist post-war project as need-

less generosity to a rapacious and ungrateful world—we have one right now.²¹ We don’t have to imagine having a president who has advocated forsaking U.S. security commitments, pursuing economic protectionism, banning refugees and immigrants from Muslim-majority countries, and building an impenetrable wall along America’s southern frontier—we have one right now. How far Trump will ultimately go on these and other issues remains uncertain.²² But many of the core concepts and initiatives of Fortress America are now front and center in the national debate.

Assessing Fortress America

So what effects would a Fortress America grand strategy have? This approach aims to reduce America’s supposedly thankless global burdens, enhance American security and sovereignty, and revitalize allegedly eroded U.S. strengths. And in fact, there would be some near-term benefits. By some estimates, granting permanent normal trade status to China in 2000 caused the loss of over 2 million U.S. jobs; certain U.S. industries—particularly segments of U.S. manufacturing—might therefore gain from protectionism.²³ Shedding alliance commitments would reduce America’s global military burdens; shedding the constraints imposed by international institutions and multilateralism would provide greater ability to act unilaterally and decisively. Stricter immigration and border controls might marginally reduce the danger of lone-wolf terrorist attacks, and deporting illegal immigrants could marginally stimulate the wages of poorly educated, native-born workers.²⁴ Acceding to spheres of

influence arrangements in East Asia or Eastern Europe could conduce to better relations with Moscow or Beijing, at least temporarily.²⁵ Finally, a more aggressive counter-terrorism strategy might defeat—at least in a narrow operational sense—groups like the Islamic State more rapidly, while an America that abandons nation-building would presumably avoid draining quagmires. In sum, Fortress America would indeed reduce certain costs of U.S. grand strategy, and provide some advantages, at least for a time.

Yet, Fortress America would also have deeply pernicious effects that would outweigh any narrow, short-term benefits. Most broadly, it would shred the international order that Washington has long promoted. The relatively high levels of international stability and security that the world has enjoyed since World War II, the maintenance of an open global economy, the unprecedented spread of liberal concepts such as democracy and human rights: all of these fundamental characteristics of the international system have rested on the geopolitical, economic, and ideological leadership of the United States, and all would, presumably, be endangered by a reversion to Fortress America. Indeed, if one accepts the relatively commonsensical premise that the actions of the world's preeminent power set the tone for the international system, then such dramatic changes in U.S. foreign policy would inevitably upend the global order, as well.²⁶

Of course, killing the liberal order might be a feature, not a glitch, of Fortress America. So the question is whether disrupting the international system could still pay dividends by enabling narrower national gains. The trouble here, however, is that Fortress America hinges on a fundamentally skewed assessment of the benefits and costs of American internationalism. As noted, there is strong evidence that an open trading system makes America far wealthier than it would be otherwise—even if the gains are unevenly distributed and some trade partners pursue predatory approaches. There is strong evidence that U.S. alliance commitments have suppressed regional instability which might otherwise erupt and force Washington to intervene—as happened during World War I and World War II—at enormous cost in lives and treasure. There is strong evidence that institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and UN actually serve as force-multipliers for U.S. power, by allowing America to project its voice through forums for which it pays only a fraction of the cost. And there is strong evidence that an international system in which democracy is dominant is likely to be more peaceful and advantageous for the United States over the long run, and that American policies have contributed enormously to the spread of democracy to date. Fortress America misses just how beneficial the post-war order has been for America—and thus dramatically understates the costs of destroying that order.²⁷

Indeed, Fortress America would simply exchange modest short-term gains for far higher long-term costs—namely, the emergence of a less prosperous and less stable world, one in which liberal political institutions such as democracy are less prevalent, and one in which the United States would ultimately suffer a

Fortress America would simply exchange modest short-term gains for far higher long-term costs.

great deal as well. And when one examines Fortress America more closely, even some of the shorter-term gains prove illusory. Fortress America emphasizes a more aggressive approach to counter-terrorism—but by disrupting U.S. alliances and alienating Muslim communities at home and abroad, it would surely undercut both the international and domestic cooperation essential to any counter-terrorism strategy. Fortress America emphasizes strengthening American sovereignty and aggressively curbing illegal immigration—but killing

NAFTA and immiserating Mexico would only exacerbate the economic underdevelopment that drives migrants to the United States. “Energy independence” seems like a worthwhile goal, but realizing it would require the nearly impossible task of completely sealing the United States off from the global energy market.²⁸ Fortress America may seem alluring, but its key components are frequently unachievable, contradictory, or counterproductive.

In fact, Fortress America could prove profoundly self-destructive to American power. The United States has historically been able to wield preeminent global power with remarkably little global pushback, primarily because it has generally wielded that power in an inclusive, multilateral, and broadly beneficial way.²⁹ Yet, if Washington were to adopt a more zero-sum policy based on promoting its interests at the expense of others, if it were to become more aggressively unilateral and standoffish, other countries might come to view U.S. power as more threatening than reassuring—and they might work more determinedly to counter American influence through diplomatic, economic, or other means. Fortress America would thus represent the self-inflicted death of the relatively benign American superpower that the world has known for the past 70 years, and the advent of a scarier superpower that would engender vastly increased international resistance.

A Better Nationalism

Fortunately, a nationalistic grand strategy need not be nearly so disastrous. It could represent a more benign and constructive nationalism—essentially,

internationalism with a nationalist accent. This “better nationalism” would not dismantle the post-war order or undo America’s post-war project, yet it would take a harder-edged and more disciplined approach to asserting U.S. interests within those contexts. In particular, this approach would emphasize striking better deals, more evenly distributing burdens, and better protecting American sovereignty and finite resources, while still preserving—even strengthening—America’s global role and proactively sustaining the international system. This strategy truly would put “America first,” by enhancing its relative position within a positive-sum order that has served the nation so well.³⁰

The intellectual starting point for this approach is a recognition that American internationalism has been, on balance, enormously successful—but that aspects thereof are misfiring right now. For all its benefits, globalization has indeed injured certain sectors of American manufacturing and displaced U.S. workers; trade competitors such as China have pursued mercantilist and predatory policies while accessing open U.S. markets. U.S. alliances have kept the peace, but burden-sharing has become decidedly unbalanced. International institutions generally enhance U.S. influence, but have sometimes become dysfunctional or been turned to anti-American purposes. Democracy promotion makes sense, but armed nation-building has proven frustrating and costly. These issues, in turn, have fueled popular dissatisfaction with American internationalism and shown that a modified approach is necessary.

A resulting turn toward a more nationalist internationalism would hardly be unprecedented. During the 1980s, Ronald Reagan pursued a hard-nosed trade policy designed to punish discriminatory practices and ensure that the costs of globalization were not borne disproportionately by U.S. firms and workers, even as he also laid the foundations for the Uruguay Round of global trade negotiations.³¹ Before that, Richard Nixon worked assiduously to offload excessive burdens and enhance U.S. advantage within the confines of the post-war system. Nixon killed the Bretton Woods system of international finance by suspending dollar-gold convertibility at \$35-per-ounce, thereby permitting dollar depreciation and advantageously restructuring U.S. trade relations.³² He also enacted the Nixon Doctrine, which maintained U.S. alliances in Asia but forced those allies to take primary responsibility for defending themselves from insurgencies and other non-traditional threats.³³ Nixon thus put “America first” in a variety of foreign relationships, not to destroy American internationalism but to sustain it amid more difficult conditions. Today, a better nationalism would emulate this basic approach.

American internationalism has been enormously successful, but aspects are misfiring right now.

Elements of a Better Nationalism

First, this strategy would involve what Reagan's treasury secretary, James Baker, called "free trade with a bite."³⁴ The United States would still lead an open global trading system, while acting more aggressively to punish unfair practices and ensure that global rules are actually respected. This could entail, as during the 1980s, energetic use of targeted "301" sanctions to combat discriminatory measures and ensure fair access and equal opportunity for U.S. companies and goods.³⁵ It would likely involve a harder-edged approach to China—which has maintained numerous discriminatory practices despite joining the WTO—using just these methods.³⁶ Washington might also renegotiate existing agreements, such as NAFTA, to address problems and asymmetries that have emerged since their creation. And in the future, Washington might even distance itself from multilateral pacts—in which, it has been argued, U.S. leverage is diluted—in favor of bilateral deals. In this scenario, America might ditch TPP, but replace it, for example, with a U.S.–Japan trade deal. Crucially, all of these actions, particularly targeted sanctions, would be accompanied by ongoing negotiations to further open markets, and by assurances that the goal is making free trade genuinely fair and rules-based, rather than retreating into protectionism.

Second, a better nationalism would require sharper-elbowed alliance management. The United States would reaffirm alliance commitments, but make crystal clear that those commitments will eventually become unsustainable absent meaningful reforms and better burden-sharing. Along these lines, U.S. officials might make additional U.S. deployments in Europe or East Asia contingent on greater allied defense efforts, and continually seek ways of showing that the highest-performing allies will receive priority consideration in Washington. They might forthrightly explain to consistent underperformers, such as Taiwan, that keeping U.S. security guarantees over time requires developing and adequately funding a realistic defense strategy. Washington could also push NATO to devote greater institutional emphasis to counter-terrorism challenges such as the counter-ISIS fight—where NATO's institutional contribution, and that of many members, has been anemic—and promote a better division of labor by providing more directive input into allies' defense strategy reviews. (The Pentagon did just this during the United Kingdom's 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review.) These efforts would go hand-in-hand with continued reassurance, but greater candor with—and, frankly, pressure on—allies and partners would be essential.³⁷

Third, and related, would be a significant military buildup focused on both self-defense and collective defense. The United States would reverse recent disinvestment in defense and address the ongoing erosion of its relative military strength—critical components of any strong, nationalist approach. Yet, it would invest not only in self-defense capabilities emphasized by Fortress America, but also in enhanced forward presence in key regions and the capabilities—from additional

attack submarines to fifth-generation strike fighters to heavy armored brigades—necessary to help properly motivated allies defend themselves. This buildup would not substitute for greater allied investments; it would be the carrot accompanying the aforementioned sticks. In the past, U.S. allies have been most inclined to do more in their own defense as part of a broader strengthening of collective defense; putting more U.S. skin in the game could therefore induce others to do likewise.³⁸

This concept leads to a fourth element: an intensified campaign against radical jihadist groups that present the most immediate danger to U.S. lives and security. Like Fortress America, a better nationalism would cast off some self-imposed constraints of recent years—perhaps by using modest numbers of ground troops to clear out jihadist safe havens more quickly, or by accepting a marginally higher tolerance for civilian casualties.³⁹ But this approach would reject proposals—such as reviving torture or creating a Muslim registry—that would dramatically alienate global opinion and compromise international counter-terrorism cooperation. Moreover, this approach would feature an insistence that intensified U.S. efforts be matched by America’s Muslim partners, to include providing ground troops (perhaps supported by U.S. advisers and airpower), more aggressively attacking terrorist finances and ideology, and funding post-conflict reconstruction. Admittedly, such contributions have traditionally been—and remain—far easier to demand than to achieve, but Washington might “start small” by increasing efforts to train small unit leaders and senior officers, thereby creating pockets of greater competence within Arab militaries.⁴⁰

Cooperation with Muslim partners relates to a fifth pillar of this approach. Here, U.S. officials would frankly acknowledge the limited returns and high costs of prolonged stabilization and nation-building missions, and the way in which such interventions can corrode domestic support for American internationalism. Washington would therefore cast a skeptical eye toward humanitarian military intervention, and insist that local forces and Muslim partners—supported by unique U.S. enabling capabilities—bear the brunt of any stabilization missions needed to prevent defeated terrorist groups from resurging. Yet, this reticence would not be pursued as part of a broader geopolitical abdication or an outright abandonment of democracy and human rights promotion. Rather, in the best tradition of the Nixon Doctrine, this approach would represent an effort to minimize the most costly and frustrating aspects of American internationalism in order to sustain the broader tradition. Moreover, Washington would continue non-military efforts to promote democracy and human rights overseas, for they represent cost-effective ways of advancing American interests and values alike.⁴¹

Regarding great-power relations, a sixth key area, a better nationalism would differ only marginally from current U.S. policy—but it would differ dramatically from Fortress America. Here, the emphasis would *not* be on establishing spheres

of influence so that America could retrench. Although Washington would continue pursuing pragmatic cooperation where interests align, the emphasis instead would be on upholding U.S. commitments that restrain these great-power rivals (and that represent America's word of honor as a nation), and on pushing back more sharply when U.S. interests and sovereignty are transgressed. Chinese coercion of U.S. allies, harassment of U.S. vessels and aircraft operating in international waters, and violations of international law in the South China Sea; Russian intimidation of NATO members and intervention in the U.S. electoral process—these are actions a robust but sensible nationalism would more strongly oppose. And such opposition works better when supported by robust alliances and significant military power—two other aspects of this strategy. A true American nationalist, Theodore Roosevelt, highlighted the importance of maintaining geopolitical order and carrying a big stick; a better nationalism reflects both imperatives.⁴²

The final aspects of this strategy can be briefly summarized. America would not quit or cripple international institutions, but would more aggressively use U.S. leverage to shape or reform them—by using the threat of selective funding cuts to overhaul the deservedly maligned UN Human Rights Council or UN peacekeeping operations, for instance. Likewise, a better nationalism might well emphasize strengthening U.S. sovereignty through better control of the southern border.

The goal of a better nationalism would be to improve, not abandon, America's internationalist tradition.

But this would come as part of what Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly has called a "layered defense," one that treats Mexico and the Central American countries as partners rather than adversaries, and continues to assist them—via robust trade, public security assistance, and other means—in addressing the economic deprivation and citizen insecurity that drive illegal immigration.⁴³ Across these and other initiatives, the goal of a better nationalism is to improve, rather than abandon, America's internationalist tradition.

A Better Nationalism

So what are the strengths and liabilities of this approach? For starters, all of the individual initiatives sketched previously entail their own drawbacks and dilemmas. Using targeted sanctions too aggressively could undermine rather than strengthen the global trading system; emphasizing bilateral rather than multilateral trade deals could have the same effect, while also making weaker trade partners less inclined to pursue such deals with the United States in the first place.⁴⁴ Getting

tougher with allies risks upsetting what have been remarkably organic and constructive international relationships of long standing; it also raises the question of what Washington should do when one or more of its allies inevitably fails to improve performance sufficiently.⁴⁵ Taking even a modestly more aggressive approach to counter-terrorism might improve operational effectiveness, but it also increases the probable military risks and costs.⁴⁶ Pushing back more firmly on great-power coercion carries dangers of escalation and increased conflict. All these initiatives come with significant advantages, too, but they are by no means panaceas.

These points touch on a second and broader challenge. Although a better nationalism would be far milder than Fortress America, it would still involve significant international disruption. Getting better deals requires bargaining harder; bargaining harder means exerting real pressure on interlocutors. A better nationalism would thus require deliberately engendering greater friction with actors from China and Saudi Arabia to NATO and the UN; those actors would likely push back and find ways of making their displeasure known.⁴⁷ The result is likely to be a period of considerable turbulence in U.S. diplomacy, as existing arrangements shift and key relationships—with allies and rivals alike—are renegotiated. There is also, of course, the danger that the initiatives outlined here might prove insufficient to secure more advantageous arrangements and better burden-sharing. U.S. officials would then confront the unpalatable options of either escalating pressure and risking more severe ruptures and crises, or simply backing down and leaving the original problem unresolved.

This point underscores a third difficulty, which is that executing this approach effectively would require real skill and sophistication. As noted, all of the initiatives discussed here have their difficulties. Yet, the overarching challenge is how to shock the system enough to achieve meaningful change—as Nixon did in the 1970s by ending Bretton Woods—without breaking it in the process. Pressure and reassurance are both essential, in other words, and careful calibration is at once vital and hard to achieve. Too much pressure can damage valuable relationships, cause confrontation with allies and competitors, and make Washington look like a dangerous bully. But too much reassurance can undercut the pressure that is essential to getting results. In the past, presidents even now recognized for their diplomatic achievements—such as Nixon and Reagan—often found this a tricky balance to strike.

Pursuing a better nationalism, then, is no silver bullet. But it does carry distinct strategic advantages, especially when compared to Fortress America. First, it

The challenge is how to shock the system to achieve meaningful change without breaking it in the process.

reflects the fact that America possesses great inherent ability to push for better terms in its myriad foreign relationships, because it is the only actor capable of providing public goods such as leadership of the international economy or security in key regions.⁴⁸ Today, ironically enough, this approach may be even better primed to succeed, because Trump's election has already delivered a massive shock to the system. It has shown actors around the world that they cannot take U.S. leadership for granted, at a time when resurgent global turmoil and insecurity are simultaneously reminding U.S. partners of how vital that leadership is. If Trump or future presidents act wisely and avoid overdoing it, perhaps they can leverage that shock to reset and rebalance key relationships in a constructive way.

Second, this strategy is broadly consistent with the national mood. As noted, the American people may be world-weary, but they are not fleeing headlong into 1930s-style isolationism. There is frustration with globalization and unequal burden-sharing—which Trump skillfully and demagogically channeled in 2016—but little evidence to suggest that the electorate desires simply to discard trade or alliances. Public views of American internationalism thus reflect ambivalence and dissatisfaction, not total rejection.⁴⁹ A better nationalism addresses and provides avenues for ameliorating that dissatisfaction, without going too far and dismantling an internationalism that has benefitted the U.S. public quite well.

Third, if this strategy might thereby put American internationalism on sounder political footing, it could actually put the post-war international system itself on firmer footing as well. As scholars have noted, and as discussed here, that

system has occasionally required tweaking, in the form of reallocating burdens, resetting key relationships, and marginally revising the leading power's role.⁵⁰ This was precisely what Nixon and other U.S. policymakers attempted during the 1970s, and their efforts helped sustain American leadership and the international system for another 40 years. If American policymakers can emulate that approach today, perhaps they can once again shore up U.S. internationalism and extend a remarkably favorable order.

Nixon attempted precisely this strategy during the 1970s, helping sustain U.S. leadership for 40 years.

Which Way Will America Go?

The crucial question, then, is not which of these grand strategies is preferable from the perspective of U.S. interests, but which one will prevail today? And as Donald Trump's presidency unfolds, the clash between Fortress America

and a better nationalism is already shaping up to be a defining theme of the administration.

President Trump, along with top political aides such as Steve Bannon, is clearly attracted to something like Fortress America. After all, Trump used the occasion of his inaugural address to paint a bleak picture of a zero-sum world in which post-war U.S. internationalism has served mainly to strengthen others at America's expense. "For many decades," he declared, "we've enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry; subsidized the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military; we've defended other nations' borders while refusing to defend our own; and spent trillions of dollars overseas while America's infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay."⁵¹ After taking office, Trump quickly did several things that arguably reflected a Fortress America mindset: withdrawing from TPP (without proposing an alternative) and continuing to tout the merits of protectionism, berating longtime U.S. allies and reportedly telling them that Washington "wants our money back," doubling down on the idea of fortifying the southern border and using trade sanctions to make Mexico pay for it, and others.⁵² Perhaps these were all just opening bids in a shrewd negotiating strategy. But since Trump has lambasted key tenets of U.S. internationalism for decades, perhaps Fortress America is what he truly prefers.⁵³

Given the formidable power of the presidency in foreign affairs, this is disconcerting news for those who understand the likely consequences of Fortress America. Fortunately, however, there are also constraints and countervailing forces. Some core features of post-war internationalism—such as U.S. alliances—are deeply institutionalized and difficult to unwind. Moreover, most of Trump's own foreign policy advisers apparently prefer a better nationalism to Fortress America. Michael Flynn, Trump's first national security adviser, called for "re-baselining"—not rupturing—U.S. alliances and other key relationships in remarks made during the transition. In February 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis made his first foreign trip to Asia to reassure U.S. allies.⁵⁴ On a subsequent trip to Europe, Mattis blended reaffirmations of U.S. commitment to NATO with a blunt warning that the alliance might suffer over time without greater European efforts.⁵⁵

Most of Trump's own foreign policy advisers apparently prefer a better nationalism to Fortress America.

There is also little sympathy within the GOP-controlled Congress for Fortress America; key senators such as John McCain and Lindsey Graham have long blended hawkish nationalism with a deep commitment to U.S. global engagement. Likewise, although some U.S. manufacturing concerns might favor protectionism, the most powerful elements of today's business community—such as large

financial firms and the high-tech sector—are deeply dependent on global markets, capital, and talent, and appear willing to use their political clout to protect that access.⁵⁶ Finally, the foreign policy bureaucracy is internationalist to its core, and can be expected to use the dark arts of foot-dragging and bureaucratic warfare to resist isolationist or radical impulses. Over time, and as some of the liabilities of Fortress America appear, these factors may pull the administration away from that model and toward a milder, better form of nationalist internationalism.

Which of these two tendencies will prevail, and in what proportion, thus remains to be determined. One fears that President Trump may be inclined to pursue Fortress America with all its destructive effects; one hopes, for the sake of the international order and America itself, that this administration will ultimately find its way toward a better nationalism that could actually be fairly constructive.

Notes

1. This section draws particularly on G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
2. See, variously, Robert Kagan, *The World America Made* (New York: Vintage, 2012); Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, *America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Douglas Irwin, *Free Trade Under Fire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Alfred Eckes and Thomas Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
3. See James Goldgeier, "The Hillary Clinton Doctrine," *National Interest*, April 21, 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-hillary-clinton-doctrine-12681>.
4. See Pew Research Center, "Public Uncertain, Divided Over America's Place in the World," May 5, 2016, <http://www.people-press.org/2016/05/05/6-nato-u-s-allies-the-eu-and-un/>; Allan Smith, "POLL: Majority of Americans Support the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Globalization," *Business Insider*, September 7, 2016, <http://www.businessinsider.com/poll-most-americans-like-trade-deal-2016-9>.
5. On 1990s-era antecedents, see Hal Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 147-157; also Pew Research Center, "Public Uncertain, Divided Over America's Place in the World."
6. Thom Shanker, "Blunt U.S. Warning Reveals Deep Strains in NATO," *New York Times*, June 10, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/world/europe/11nato.html>.
7. Paul Lewis, "Most Americans Think U.S. Should 'Mind Its Own Business' Abroad, Survey Finds," *Guardian*, December 3, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/03/american-public-mind-its-own-business-survey>.

8. James Surowiecki, "Economic Populism at the Primaries," *The New Yorker*, February 22, 2016, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/22/trump-sanders-and-the-american-worker>.
9. Cristiano Lima, "Trump Calls Trade Deal 'A Rape of Our Country,'" *Politico*, June 28, 2016, <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-trump-trans-pacific-partnership-224916>.
10. Aaron Eglitis, Toluse Olorunnipa, and Andy Sharp, "Trump's NATO Skepticism Raises Alarm for Allies Near Russia," *Bloomberg*, July 21, 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-21/trump-says-u-s-may-not-defend-nato-allies-against-russia-attack-iqvw8gki>.
11. Donald Trump, "Trump on Foreign Policy," *The National Interest*, April 27, 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/trump-foreign-policy-15960>; also Thomas Wright, "Trump's 19th Century Foreign Policy," *Politico*, January 20, 2016, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-foreign-policy-213546>.
12. The discussion in this section expands on the discussion in Hal Brands, *American Grand Strategy and the Liberal Order: Continuity, Change, and Options for the Future* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016), 22-25.
13. "Inaugural Address: Trump's Full Speech," CNN, January 21, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/trump-inaugural-address/>.
14. *Ibid.*
15. This idea was sometimes proposed in the years since 9/11. See, for instance, Thomas Friedman, "Dancing Alone," *New York Times*, May 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/13/opinion/dancing-alone.html?_r=0.
16. The term is used by Barry Posen, "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 1 (January/February 2013), 116-129.
17. Phrase borrowed from Colin Kahl and Hal Brands, "Trump's Grand Strategic Train Wreck," *Foreign Policy*, January 31, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/31/trumps-grand-strategic-train-wreck/>.
18. Trump broached this idea in 2016. See Stephanie Condon, "Donald Trump: Japan, South Korea Might Need Nuclear Weapons," *CBS News*, March 29, 2016, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-japan-south-korea-might-need-nuclear-weapons/>. He subsequently denied having raised the idea.
19. During the campaign, Trump often expressed ideas similar to this pillar and the previous pillar of Fortress America. See Thomas Carothers, "Prospects for U.S. Democracy Promotion under Trump," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 5, 2017, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/01/05/prospects-for-u.s.-democracy-promotion-under-trump-pub-66588>.
20. For hints of such an approach, see Max Fischer, "Trump Prepares Orders Aiming at Global Funding and Treaties," *New York Times*, January 25, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/united-nations-trump-administration.html>.
21. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Trump at National Prayer Breakfast," February 2, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/02/remarks-president-trump-national-prayer-breakfast>; also "Inaugural Address," CNN.
22. On these various issues, see the sources cited previously, as well as Kahl and Brands, "Trump's Grand Strategic Train Wreck"; Wright, "Trump's Nineteenth Century Foreign Policy"; Thomas Wright, "Trump's Team of Rivals, Riven by Distrust," *Foreign Policy*, December 14, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/14/trumps-team-of-rivals->

- riven-by-distrust/; Abby Phillip and Abigail Hauslohner, "Trump on the Future of Proposed Muslim Ban, Registry: 'You Know My Plans,'" *Washington Post*, December 22, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/12/21/trump-on-the-future-of-proposed-muslim-ban-registry-you-know-my-plans/?utm_term=.ed24d6b96371.
23. On this point, see Jim Tankersley, "What Republicans Did 15 Years Ago That Helped Create Donald Trump Today," *Washington Post*, March 21, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/21/how-republicans-helped-create-donald-trump-more-than-15-years-ago/?utm_term=.80ecc64f1f70.
 24. George Borjas, "Immigration and the American Worker: A Review of the Academic Literature," Center for Immigration Studies, April 2013, <http://cis.org/immigration-and-the-american-worker-review-academic-literature>.
 25. See Christopher Layne, "China and America: Sleepwalking to War?" *National Interest*, May–June 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-america-sleepwalking-war-12685>.
 26. See, for instance, Brooks and Wohlforth, *America Abroad*.
 27. This paragraph and the previous paragraph draw on Kagan, *The World America Made*; Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan*; Brooks and Wohlforth, *America Abroad*; Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Global Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Henry Nau, *At Home Abroad* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism*; Irwin, *Free Trade Under Fire*; Ambassador Samantha Power, "The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping," Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 9, 2015, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120915_Power_Testimony.pdf.
 28. On the illusion of energy independence, as well as the real benefits of greater U.S. energy production, see Meghan O'Sullivan, "'Energy Independence' Alone Won't Boost U.S. Power," *Bloomberg View*, February 14, 2013, <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-02-14/energy-independence-alone-won-t-boost-u-s-power>.
 29. Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan*.
 30. For a cogent recent analysis that emphasizes the deal-cutting aspect of this strategy, see Philip Zelikow, "The Art of the Global Deal," *The American Interest*, December 13, 2016, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/12/13/the-art-of-the-global-deal/>.
 31. See Hal Brands, *Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), chapter 4.
 32. Francis Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-1971* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 187-197.
 33. See Document #29, "Editorial Note," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Vol. 1, *Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972*, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d29>.
 34. Economic Policy Committee Meeting Minutes, September 9, 1985, CREST Archival Database, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland.
 35. "301" sanctions are so named because they were originally created by Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The sanctions were later amended by the "Super 301" provisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.

36. Along similar lines, see Robert Atkinson and Stephen Ezell, "Time for Constructive Confrontation with China," *The Hill*, September 25, 2015, <https://itif.org/publications/2015/09/25/time-constructive-confrontation-china>.
37. Many of the challenges and initiatives discussed in this paragraph are covered in greater length in Hal Brands, *Dealing with Allies in Decline: Alliance Management and U.S. Strategy in an Age of Global Power Shifts* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017).
38. This was true, for instance, of increased NATO defense spending in the 1950s. See, generally, Richard L. Kugler, *Laying the Foundations: The Evolution of NATO in the 1950s*, RAND Corporation Research Note, June 1990.
39. Aspects of such an approach are broached in Efraim Karsh and Eitan Shamir, "What after Counter-Insurgency? Raiding in Zones of Turmoil," *International Affairs* 92, no. 6 (2016), 1427-1441; Max Boot, "Defeating ISIS," Council of Foreign Relations, Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 51, November 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/defeating-isis/p33773>.
40. Daniel Byman, "What Trump Should Do About Terrorism (But Probably Won't)," *Lawfare*, February 16, 2017, <https://lawfareblog.com/what-trump-should-do-about-terrorism-probably-wont>.
41. See Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Decline: How Washington Can Reverse The Tide," *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 4 (July/August 2016).
42. On Roosevelt, see Frederick Marks III, *Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979).
43. Donovan Slack, "Building a Wall Not Enough to Secure Border, DHS Nominee John Kelly Says," *USA Today*, January 10, 2017, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/10/general-john-kelly-senate-homeland-security-confirmation-hearing/96346782/>.
44. See, for instance, Geoffrey Gertz, "What Will Trump's Embrace of Bilateralism Mean for America's Trade Partners?" Brookings Institution, February 8, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/02/08/what-will-trumps-embrace-of-bilateralism-mean-for-americas-trade-partners/>.
45. Jim Townsend, "Can Mattis Back Up His NATO Threat?" *Foreign Policy*, February 16, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/16/can-mattis-back-up-his-nato-threat/>.
46. For an evaluation, see Peter Feaver and Hal Brands, "Trump and Terrorism: U.S. Strategy after ISIS," *Foreign Affairs* 96, 2 (March/April 2017), 28-36.
47. The point is made in Zelikow, "Art of the Global Deal."
48. See Michael Mastanduno, "System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 121-154. Mastanduno argues that this power is in decline, in part due to the relative dearth of international security threats today, but this analysis was written prior to the significant increase in international insecurity in recent years.
49. For assessments of U.S. public opinion, see Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, and Craig Kafura, *America Divided: Political Partisanship and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, October 2015; Pew Research Center, "Public Uncertain, Divided Over America's Place in the World."
50. See Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Brands, *Making the Unipolar Moment*.

51. "Inaugural Address," CNN; also James Crabtree, "Steve Bannon's War on India's High-Tech Economy," *Foreign Policy*, February 8, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/08/steve-bannons-war-on-indias-high-tech-economy/>.
52. Trump quoted in Tara Palmieri, Kenneth Vogel, Josh Dawsey, and Nahal Toosi, "Trump's Faux Pas Diplomacy," *Politico*, February 8, 2017, <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-foreign-leaders-phone-calls-234770>.
53. See Wright, "Trump's 19th Century Foreign Policy."
54. Gregory Hellman, "Flynn Calls Alliances 'One of the Greatest Tools We Have,'" *Politico*, January 10, 2017, <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/michael-flynn-us-alliances-233421>.
55. Dan Lamothe and Michael Birnbaum, "Defense Secretary Mattis Issues New Ultimatum to NATO Allies on Defense Spending," *Washington Post*, February 15, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/02/15/mattis-trumps-defense-secretary-issues-ultimatum-to-nato-allies-on-defense-spending/?utm_term=.f7322f1988a5.
56. See Nancy Cook and Josh Dawsey, "Businesses Grow Concerned about Trump after Early Excitement," *Politico*, February 3, 2017, <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-businesses-fear-234584>; Brian Heater, "New York's Tech Community Pens Letter Condemning Trump's Immigration Ban," *Tech Crunch*, January 30, 2017, <https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/30/tech-nyc-trump/>; Bess Levin, "Why Goldman Sachs is Suddenly Worried about Donald Trump," *Vanity Fair*, February 6, 2017, <http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/02/why-goldman-sachs-is-suddenly-worried-about-donald-trump>.