Will aspiring liberal democracies help maintain the current liberal international order?¹

This current order rests on promoting and maintaining five pillars: peace and security; the market economy, especially international trade and investment; human rights and humanitarian action; sustainable development; and global spaces. Each of these areas is large and complex, and the emergence of new powers is likely to alter that system but not destabilize it.

One of the most interesting new players is Brazil, which is becoming more important both economically and diplomatically. Officials in Brasilia have sought ways to demonstrate international leadership, from hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics to campaigning for a seat on the UN Security Council. Brazil also has a lively democracy at home, the world’s seventh-largest economy, G20 membership, and peacekeeping forces deployed in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Middle East. All this would seem to support the notion that Brazil could take more of a global leadership role. Yet international leadership requires actions beyond just criticizing imperfections in current international affairs.

Nearly a decade ago, then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick urged a rising China to be a responsible stakeholder. He asserted that China had a “responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success.”² The point is even more relevant now as relative U.S. dominance ebbs.

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Liberal democracies have an especially important responsibility to international order; they not only benefit from the system, but espouse the values that underpin it.

Is Brazil a stakeholder, or a just a naysayer for the current system? Although this article compares U.S. and Brazilian approaches to international order, it should be stressed that both countries—indeed any country—can fail to meet the standards of the best international principles. The U.S. position is not necessarily always the correct one. It is the leader of the international order, but it, too, acts in its national interest. Nevertheless, this article examines the components of the current international order and concludes that Brazil is a stakeholder, but will act like a naysayer when it disagrees with and cannot change the situation. This is most likely to occur when Brazil is at odds with the leader of the international system, the United States.

The United States and Brazil share many values and interests. Ample room for cooperation exists between the two, and they have the potential to be long-term partners. However, significant fundamental policy differences will remain. To use a popular analogy, Brazil does not want to upend the power table; it wants a better seat and to be able to rewrite parts of the menu to its advantage. At the international table, Brazilian actions are most likely to diverge from those of the United States when two themes converge: 1) Brazil’s economic interests and 2) the perception of unequal treatment between the established powers and other states, including Brazil.

Those two conditions are most likely to appear in the security and economic pillars of global order. In the security area, U.S. military might, status, and global responsibilities create an inherent inequality with other countries. In contrast, Brazil has eschewed exerting military power—instead, it touts soft power propelled by diplomatic prowess to gain international stature. Economically, the U.S. advocacy of trade and investment agreements and freer trade generally, combined with lingering agricultural protection, frustrates Brazilians. Moreover, more global competition threatens important traditional economic interests in Brazil, such as legacy beneficiaries of the old import-substitution model and various forms of protectionism.

So, what will happen when Brazilian interests diverge from the global order? What should happen? The first step is to gain a greater understanding of what
Brazilian interests are, and when Brasilia, as an aspiring power, feels that the existing order does not meet its needs.

**Peace and Security**

In the security arena, two of the most persistent and profound disagreements between the United States and Brazil concern the use of force and the management of nuclear technology. Conversely, one area of cooperation is UN peacekeeping (at least on the tactical implementation of peacekeeping; there is less on the political aspects of peacekeeping missions). All three are relevant to international order.

**Use of Force**

The United States has the largest military in the world. It provides the nuclear umbrella to its allies and is the ultimate military guarantor of international order. This responsibility gives U.S. policymakers an acceptance of the use of military force. Most Americans believe military force can and should be used in certain circumstances.³ Drawing lessons from the American Civil War and World War II, many Americans believe that, at times, war is the only way to stop not just an enemy, but evil. Recalling classic just war theory, President Obama outlined the view in his Nobel Prize Peace acceptance speech: “We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth: We will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations—acting individually or in concert—will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.”⁴

He reiterated the point in his May 28, 2014, address to the cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He stated that,

> The United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it—when our people are threatened, when our livelihoods are at stake, when the security of our allies is in danger. In these circumstances, we still need to ask tough questions about whether our actions are proportional and effective and just. International opinion matters, but America should never ask permission to protect our people, our homeland, or our way of life.⁵

In contrast, Brazil has enjoyed peace with its neighbors for over 150 years. While it did join the Allies in World War II, its more lasting legacy may be the military dictatorship that ruled in Brazil from the 1964 coup to 1985. The experience has made many contemporary Brazilians wary of the utility of military force. Brazil’s attitude is similar to Germany’s in this regard: after WWII, Germany put constitutional restrictions on the use of force, and a deep
distrust of military force now infuses its political culture. Their divergent views from the rest of the world were on display in early 2011 during two Security Council votes authorizing the use of force in Libya. Brazil held the rotating presidency of the Security Council in February 2011 when the first resolution, Resolution 1970 (which imposed an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze, and referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court) was adopted. At the time, U.S. NATO ally Germany and aspiring powers Brazil, India, and South Africa were non-permanent members of the Security Council. All of them abstained on the second resolution, Resolution 1973, which authorized a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures”—which means military force—which France, the United Kingdom, and the United States supported. Speaking at a conference the following year, Brazil’s Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, explained:

[Resolution 1970] was a difficult negotiation, but there was a sense of [sic] urgency and a conviction that strong measures were needed to persuade the Libyan Government to cease violence against peaceful demonstrators. Strong measures were indeed adopted: they included an arms embargo, targeted sanctions and ICC referral.

However, this unified response did not hold when the next resolution was proposed. Brazil was one of the countries that abstained on Resolution 1973. We were not convinced that the use of force in such an open-ended manner as authorized by the resolution through the language “all necessary means” would achieve the aim of protecting civilians. We were concerned that it might generate more harm than the violence it meant to avoid.

The concerns just expressed by Louise Arbour on “protection by war” and on the danger of the birth of a neo-militarism resonate very deeply with us.6

The tough question for Brazil is what to do when the Security Council members cannot agree. The Russian Federation has defended the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, for example, with repeated vetoes of resolutions intended to curb the government-dominated violence that has killed thousands of civilians. On October 4, 2011, Russia and China vetoed a draft Security Council resolution on Syria (S/2011/612) that condemned the violence, called on the Syrian government to stop its violent offensive, and called upon other countries not to supply weapons to the conflict.7 Brazil abstained. Brazilian officials assert that Brazil’s presence as a permanent UN Security Council member would lessen polarization. However, in this case, the abstention gave political cover to the veto, and muted efforts to show global disgust with the mass murder of civilians.

Abstentions fuel the perception that Brazil does not want to take positions on hard issues. This is true in the UN General Assembly as well as the UNSC. Unlike in the Security Council, all votes are equal in the General Assembly—here, the weak can call out the actions of the strong. But when Ukraine
appealed to the UN General Assembly in March 2014 to adopt a resolution criticizing the hasty referendum held in Crimea after Russian intimidation, Brazil abstained. Moscow had ensured that the Security Council would be deadlocked. Despite having often defended the principles of sovereignty and respect for the rule of law, Brazil did not choose to side with those condemning the violation of a national border. Perhaps Brasilia did not want to lose Russian participation in the Brazilian-hosted July 2014 BRICS summit meeting, which included the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

In contrast, the Group of Eight (G8) disinvited Russia and returned to being the Group of Seven (G7). The June 2014 G7 summit meeting comprised Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Brazil missed an opportunity to show its commitment to the concept of sovereignty and global order. The stance is unfortunate, because Brazil’s well-known defense of sovereignty and its distance from the dynamics of Eastern Europe would make Brasilia’s voice all the more credible and important. The larger world would have benefited from seeing potential leaders like Brazil take a stance in support of the weaker country being pressured by a stronger one. The abstentions of liberal democracies muddied the volume of international opprobrium over the Russian Federation’s actions in Ukraine. Brazil rightly has been critical of regime change by the United States or its partners, but surprisingly quiet about Russian military pressure. Leadership does not allow sitting on the fence.

Leadership does not allow sitting on the fence.

Nuclear Technology

In addition to states, alliances, and other familiar features, the current global system includes international agreements to help manage peace and security. One of the most important international regimes covering nuclear weapons management is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, which entered into force in 1970. It created two categories of states, nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) and enshrined the obligation of NWS not to spread nuclear weapons to NNWS. Nuclear weapons states were those who had nuclear weapons as of January 1, 1967. The NPT was originally signed by three declared nuclear weapons states, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. France and China did not accede to the treaty until 1992. The nuclear “deal” rests on three components: 1) that the nuclear weapons states reduce and eventually eliminate their weapons, 2) that the non-nuclear states do not acquire nuclear weapons, and 3) that states support the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
Brazil’s discourse on nuclear technology is somewhat of a dual story. The NPT does not treat all states equally. This inherent imbalance rankles Brazil. The divergent, yet not directly conflicting, approaches of the United States and Brazil to nuclear nonproliferation exemplify how and why ongoing tension exists between them on elements of international order. Both countries support the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, but the structural differences in their status shape their policies. Thus, Brazil’s discourse on nuclear technology is somewhat of a dual story. For instance, Brazil relinquished nuclear technology and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state in 1998. However, it states that it will not sign the Additional Protocol, which allows the watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) extra inspection authority to check for undeclared nuclear material inside a country, because it argues the NWS’s have not made sufficient arms reductions.

Separately from the NPT, Brazil maintains a unique parallel nonproliferation structure. Long-time rivals and neighbors, Argentina and Brazil began in 1980 to cooperate on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, in the mid-1980s relinquished their nascent nuclear weapons technology, and in 1991 created the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to monitor the peaceful use of nuclear materials for the two countries. The ABACC helped create a nuclear weapons-free zone in Latin America under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco). In 2011, IAEA Director-General Yukio Amano went to Buenos Aires to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the ABACC, stating that "the IAEA is proud to be ABACC’s partner." Together, the ABACC and IAEA monitor the production of nuclear material to ensure it is used for peaceful purposes, with the former focused on the two countries and the latter on all NPT signatories.

However, Brasilia does not allow the IAEA to see all the enrichment technology that Brazil uses. Instead, it shows the IAEA the input and output of nuclear material, but not the machinery used to transform it from one form to another. Brazilian economic interests may be a factor here—it might see commercial applications for the technology. Brazil also has a long-running program to produce a nuclear-powered submarine; this project may contribute to building a deep-water navy, or it may be a legacy/prestige project for the military.

Brazil is proud that it has renounced nuclear weapons. Some officials assert that this history gives Brazil special credibility on nuclear nonproliferation issues. Indeed, some suggest that in 2010, Iranian officials were interested in
seeking Brazil’s help in diplomatic negotiations precisely because of this history of creating a unique arrangement on nuclear technology. Moreover, Brazil’s status as a non-P5 middle-power made it a more acceptable interlocutor than more powerful states. Brazil felt that, along with Turkey, two rising powers could achieve a breakthrough on a subject usually the province of the powerful P5, and in which Brasilia believes non-nuclear weapons states are treated as second-class members.

The Brazilian view of its unique role and the United States’ view collided in the 2010 diplomatic dust-up over the Brazil–Turkey agreement with Iran. This agreement involved Iran sending low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for enriched fuel for a research reactor. However, by the time of the agreement in May 2010, the amount of low-enriched uranium to be covered no longer represented the bulk of the estimated Iranian stockpile. Brazilian diplomats note that the Joint Plan of Action agreed with Iran in late 2013 is not dissimilar to the Brazil–Turkey–Iran declaration over three years earlier.12

The divergence between Brazil and several other countries resurfaces annually at the UN General Assembly. Each year, the UNGA adopts various resolutions on the elimination of nuclear weapons. In 2013, three declared nuclear powers (the United States, France, and the UK); NATO ally Germany; and emerging powers India, South Africa, and Turkey all voted for the resolution entitled, “United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (A/RES/68/51). Brazil abstained. The text included an exhortation to enact the Model Additional Protocol on safeguards with the IAEA, which Brazil has not done. Conversely, in 2013, Brazil voted for the resolution on nuclear disarmament (A/RES/68/47), on which South Africa abstained and Germany voted no. However, South Africa, Germany, and Turkey joined Brazil to vote for the UNGA resolution “Towards a nuclear-free world” on which nuclear weapons powers the United States, the UK, and France voted no (A/Res/68/39).

The United States and Brazil both want to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons; both see multilateral agreements as important components of that effort. Yet, conflicting approaches to the means obscures their shared interest in a common end. The structural difference between Brazil and the P5 nuclear weapons states mean that there are likely to be future disagreements and misunderstandings, despite the shared goal of halting the spread of nuclear weapons. As Brazil seeks a larger role in the international order, debates over the use of force and nuclear nonproliferation are likely to continue to spark friction and cast doubt on Brazil’s intentions among policymakers inside the Beltway, as well as reinforce frustration among Brasilia’s officials.
Peacekeeping

United Nations peacekeeping is one area of policy convergence between the United States and Brazil. Under the Obama administration, the United States has recommitted to supporting and improving UN peacekeeping as an important tool for addressing complex crises. In this case, Brazil’s actions reinforce its status as a stakeholder in the international order and as a contributor to peace and security. For example, Brazil overcame its traditional reluctance to “interfere” in other countries to take on a leading role in peacekeeping in Haiti in 2004. In 2005, Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota explained the evolution in the Brazilian position: “Brazil remains committed to the established principles of international relations, such as non-interference in internal affairs. At the same time, President Lula has been formulating another, equally important concept: the notion of non-indifference to other peoples’ plights.”

Brazil ranks among the top twenty troop contributors to UN peacekeeping, and has expanded its peacekeeping commitment from commanding the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to providing the troop commander in one of the UN’s largest and most difficult missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and taking command of the Maritime Task Force associated with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). For many, Brazil’s commitment to peacekeeping reinforces its case to be a permanent member of the Security Council.

Indeed, one of the clearest examples of Brazil claiming to be a stakeholder is its efforts to become a permanent member of the Security Council. Brazil’s vigorous advocacy, particularly under former President Lula, demonstrated that powerful elements within the country want to be seen as global stakeholders. Brazil is a member of the Group of Four (G4—Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan), which coordinates efforts to expand the Security Council. The G4 are likely to raise the issue again in 2015 as the UN celebrates its seventieth anniversary. Here, the United States and Brazilian positions are not very far apart. The Obama administration favors a modest expansion of the Council. During President Obama’s 2011 visit to Brazil he said,

That’s why the United States will continue our efforts to make sure that the new realities of the 21st century are reflected in international institutions, as Madam President mentioned, including the United Nations, where Brazil aspires to a seat on the Security Council. As I told President Rousseff, the United States is going to keep working with Brazil and other nations on reforms that make the Security Council more effective, more efficient, more representative, and advance our shared vision of a more secure and peaceful world.14
While many in Brazil were disappointed that the phrasing was not exactly what he said while in New Delhi, this was the most inviting statement by a U.S. President on possible permanent Brazilian membership on the UNSC. In his November 2010 address to a Joint Session of the Indian Parliament, President Obama had said, “...I can say today, in the years ahead, I look forward to a reformed United Nations Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.” The United States does not oppose Security Council expansion. Washington could work with most of the likely constellations of new entrants. For example, the Group of Four includes two treaty allies (Germany and Japan) and two friends (Brazil and India). Expansion looks less attractive from Beijing, however. The G4’s scheme would add China’s two large Asian rivals to the Security Council.

International Trade and Investment

The question of Brazil as an economic stakeholder is most salient when examining international trade and investment. Brasilia is an advocate for, and stakeholder in, the global trading system at a time when many other countries are looking at alternative regional mechanisms. It strongly supports the World Trade Organization (WTO), where each country is equal. Here, Brazil can, and has, won decisions against the world’s largest economy. In 2004, a WTO dispute panel ruled that the United States must dismantle its subsidies to cotton farmers, sparking a decade of efforts to comply. Brasilia also expended diplomatic capital to run a successful worldwide campaign to have a Brazilian, Roberto Azevêdo, elected to head the WTO.

Meanwhile, the United States and the European Union are negotiating a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that would dramatically change trade in the Atlantic region; Brazil is not a party. Countries of the Pacific Rim, including the United States and Mexico, are negotiating a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); Brazil is not a party to this either. Andean neighbors Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico created the Pacific Alliance in 2012 as another way to connect to international trade in the Asia–Pacific area; Brazil is not a party. Brazil only has free trade agreements with two of the Pacific Alliance countries: Chile and Peru. Brazil does not have a free trade arrangement with the United States, having undercut the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. The FTAA would have
created a hemispheric trade pact, but deadlocked over agricultural and other protectionist measures.

Instead, Brazil is linked to Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela in the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur, also known by its Spanish acronym, Mercosur). Mercosul began in 1991 with the Treaty of Asunción as part of the rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil. Mercosur is not on the forefront of opening markets internationally, and its inconclusive free trade negotiations with the European Union have stretched for over a decade. Ironically, there may have been an unintended benefit to international trade, in that Mercosur’s tariff settings may have helped politicians resist pressure from uncompetitive domestic industries to raise tariffs.

The world is changing, and over the past decade, Brazil’s pattern of trade has shifted. Between 2003 and 2011, gross exports to the United States dropped by 53.2 percent and gross imports from the United States fell by 24.8 percent as trade flowed to China. Columbia University professor Albert Fishlow notes the tension of changing perspectives: “Brazil has entered the global market more vigorously than anyone imagined twenty years ago. Exports have grown and diversified by type as well as destination. Argentina no longer is the preferred choice. Today China and India are the desired economic and political partners.” Brazil will need to decide where its future lies.

In recent years, Brazil’s trade has increased with China and decreased with Europe. Overall trade is spread almost evenly among the United States, China, and Europe. Brazil still enjoys strong trade links with advanced developed economies. In 2011, the United States still accounted for over 10 percent of Brazil’s exports, but China took 17 percent, up from just over 6 percent in 2003 and about equal to Brazil’s gross exports to all of South America. Over the same period, Brazil’s gross exports to Europe fell by 18 percent, and gross imports from Europe fell 24 percent. However, Europe still receives a quarter of Brazil’s gross exports. Brazil’s exports to Africa increased by 25.6 percent, but still account for less than 5 percent of exports. Brazil trades with many countries, but its commerce is not necessarily more diversified. Even though Brazil is an industrialized country, primary commodities account for a significant portion of trade with China.

Brazil is a stakeholder in multilateral economic institutions. It is a member of the WTO and the G20. Established powers, including the United States under the Obama administration, support the recalibration of voting powers in the International Monetary Fund (which was delayed pending Senate confirmation of this treaty change) that will increase Brazil’s position. This is neither altruism nor benevolence. Brazil benefits from the multilateral system. As part of the Doha Development Round, Brazil and India pushed for changes in Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), allowing developing
countries to supersede drug companies’ patent protections to manufacture
genetic versions of medicines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. Both
countries are home to institutions that make generic drugs. Brazil’s development
assistance includes medicines and health products. Moreover, as health policy
analyst and former diplomat Katherine Bliss observes, “Brazil views health as a
potential driver of economic growth...” Thus, Brazil’s diplomatic support for
affordable generic medicines favors not only poor, ill patients, but also Brazil’s
pharmaceutical industry.

**Human Rights**

Brazil already is, and acts like, a stakeholder on international human rights. The
issue of human rights accountability has powerful resonance as Brazil’s Truth
Commission conducts its work. The Commission will conduct a two-year
investigation of murders and disappearances from 1946–1988, spanning periods
of military rule. Brazilian officials note the importance of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in Brazil’s recovery from dictatorship. The Court is an
autonomous mechanism within the Organization of American States, which
began hearing cases in 1979.

The United States and Brazil could help sustain a consensus for international
human rights. Both are multietnic liberal democracies that have struggled to
overcome the legacy of slavery and in recent years sought to build inclusive societies. The U.S. civil
rights movement and the Brazilian *Fome Zero*
campaign to reduce hunger are significant
achievements that have inspired many. The
continued defense of the universality of human
rights should be at the core of their cooperation.
Indeed, they have worked well together at the
UN Human Rights Council to advance equal
treatment for LGBT people: they co-sponsored the 2011 UN Human Rights
Council measure, the first UN resolution on LGBT rights ever adopted. The
United States has modified its rigidity to find ways to agree with Europe, Brazil,
and others that economic, social, and cultural issues are important to human
dignity. Meanwhile, Brazil has been able to modify its resistance to “naming and
shaming” in order to support country-specific resolutions against egregious
human rights violators. Traditionally, Brazil was critical of the uneven
application of human rights standards and reluctant to single out only certain
countries for international opprobrium. Yet, the severity of the situation in Syria
compelled Brazil to vote for Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the
deterioration of human rights and need for humanitarian aid.
Both the United States and Brazil consider human rights to be universal. Norm-setting in this field rests on diplomatic coalition-building and cooperation across geographical regions. Both countries’ ability to rally supporters can help carry the day in New York and Geneva. Like many countries, Brazil is reluctant to vote for resolutions that single out specific countries. Resolutions that the United States sees as holding governments accountable for their actions, Brazil condemns as “naming and shaming.” Brazil also tends to be more critical of governments in the specialized chamber of the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council, rather than the highly visible General Assembly’s Third Committee. While in Geneva, Brazil has supported measures regarding Iran and Syria; in New York, Brazil did not join the majorities in favor. For example, on December 20, 2012, Brazil abstained on General Assembly resolutions on human rights in Syria (A/RES/67/183, which passed 135 yes/12 no/36 abstentions). On the same day, Brazil abstained on a resolution on Iran that was adopted by a much closer margin (A/Res/67/182; 86 yes/32 no/65 abstentions).

Brazil may be closer to the mainstream on tactics, but it does defend the principle of universal human rights. This stance is admirable at a time when this principle is under threat from countries and advocates who have repackaged cultural relativist arguments for a multiculturalist era. Proponents of this backlash argue that different cultures should have different types of human rights. Therefore, international human rights are an area where continued U.S. and Brazilian cooperation could help preserve an important pillar of international order. Brazil’s credibility on South–South cooperation can help overcome the misperception that human rights are only advocated by the “North.”

When cultivated diplomatically, Brazil may join important stands for international human rights, but its support cannot be assumed. Brazil’s support is more likely if a resolution can be characterized as supporting a principle than targeting one country.

**Development**

As Brazil expands its development assistance, it can advance norms and values even if it does not do so explicitly. Brazil’s development assistance has expanded significantly in recent years. Yet its continued contact with human rights abusers will cause friction with other donors. The United States will look askance at Brazil’s work with Lusophone Equatorial Guinea whose poor human rights record has been widely criticized. Meanwhile, Brazil is critical of the decades-old U.S. embargo of Cuba. Brazil argues its non-hierarchical, “horizontal” South–South model for development assistance is more palatable
to developing countries’ governments. Brazil and China are both extending assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. China’s aid eschews human rights and environmental conditions. By incorporating its values into its assistance, Brazil can advance international order.

Yet, the experience with patent medicines provides a cautionary tale. As the home of leading pharmaceutical companies, the United States is a strong defender of patents and intellectual property rights. Brazil’s pharmaceutical companies make high-standard generic medicines. Each country supports its industry. At the WTO TRIPS negotiations, Brazil pushed to circumvent patents to produce certain medicines in the developing world, a stance which advanced its soft power image as a promoter of global health, but also its economic interests. As an increasingly important donor, and as the host of several UN conferences on sustainable development including the twentieth anniversary “Rio+20” in 2012, Brazil has a voice on international development policy. As Brazil transitions from recipient to donor, it could be more explicit in supporting human rights and other norms in development assistance.

The Critical Global Commons: the Internet

Yet there is also scope for Brazil to play important constructive roles. The impact of the Internet revolution is still being felt internationally. How to maintain open access while managing international connectivity is still being resolved. This is a new area without the hierarchy among states as in the nonproliferation regime. Managing the Internet global commons could also suggest an area of cooperation between the United States and Brazil on norm-setting in a new era. Ironically, after the tensions over NSA spying, Internet policy may yet emerge as a sphere of cooperation among some established and emerging democracies. It is easier to adopt standards at the beginning or end of the life-cycle of a technology. Although the Internet is not new, its rapid growth and its degree of penetration into people’s lives suggest that it has crossed the threshold into a new phase.

The surprising U.S., Brazilian, and European agreement on “multi-stakeholder” approaches at the April 2014 NetMunial conference in Sao Paulo suggest new scope for cooperation to support a single, open global Internet. In the months following the NSA scandal in 2013, Brazilian politicians responded by suggesting national infrastructure for Internet traffic, as opposed to having Brazilian data flow through U.S.-based servers. Supporting national controls could give cover to China, Iran, and others who want state control of the Internet. Yet by spring 2014, the debate in Brazil had evolved to espouse an innovative approach with input from governments, private companies, civil society, experts, and others. The cooperation will be tested
by a cascade of international events, from the September 2014 Internet Governance Forum to the International Telecommunications Union Plenipotentiary Conference in October–November 2014.

Even on the politically charged issue of Internet privacy after the revelations of NSA spying on President Rousseff and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, diplomats found an accommodation. On November 26, 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted the Brazilian–German resolution on “The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age” by consensus. All countries, including the United States, supported it. On Internet issues Brazil is poised to be a supporter of international order, if it chooses. In this new area of international politics, less burdened by old perceptions of inequality, Brazil does not need to be a naysayer. Indeed, underneath the rhetoric, Brazil could claim to be seeking a new tenet of international order that defends personal privacy.

Outlook

Brazil’s choice of orientation will shape its future actions. Does it want to be a smaller player among the big global states, or be a leader of the emerging powers, or be the champion of the “Global South?” Realists could argue that leading the South maximizes Brazil’s power position by giving it a platform from which to take on the North. Brazil could remain the big fish in a small pond. This scenario is possible, but not the only reason South–South cooperation may fit Brazil today. Cultural and historic links may enrich these diplomatic connections. Acknowledging the African origins of over half his country’s population, President Lula deepened contacts across the South Atlantic politically and economically. These contacts promote social inclusion at home of people of African descent, and advance both Brazil’s economic interest in expanding its markets and its geopolitical interests in building contacts with a region with over fifty votes in the United Nations.

Brazil participates in several groupings, including the BRICS (an economics grouping comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa in order to promote South–South cooperation). Observers in other liberal democracies wonder about the coherence of the BRICS. China’s economy is much bigger than those of the other four, and Russia has violated the sovereignty of a weaker neighbor—making it a revisionist, not a status quo power. The BRICS format, however, does enable emerging powers to meet with established powers China and Russia. Participation in the BRICS and IBSA formations gives Brazil diplomatic flexibility and enhances its identity as a responsible stakeholder. Touting affinity with BRICS creates qualms inside the Beltway—and perhaps along Brasilia’s Esplanada dos Ministérios, too. Brazil’s interests do not always align
with its BRICS partners. For example, Chinese and Brazilian exports compete in some developing countries’ markets.

Ironically, diplomatic friction may arise because both the United States and Brazil occupy some of the same political space. Despite the disparities in their global power positions, these two countries have a lot in common. The United States and Brazil share a commitment to many values, including liberal democracy at home. Both are large, multi-ethnic states that have struggled with the legacies of centuries of slavery, which was only abolished in both countries in the late nineteenth century. Their sheer size and complexity have spawned tendencies to look inward, not internationally. Both see themselves as unique in their respective continents and in the world at large. Both had achieved independence and consolidated their national identities by the early nineteenth century. Both see themselves as countries of immigration that offer models of society in the new world in contrast to the realms of their former colonial powers. The warmth of relations between the two has waxed and waned over the past century, but each one has included the other in its efforts expand its international presence. The United States’ first embassy in South America was in Brazil; Brazil’s first embassy abroad was in Washington, DC. Like most governments, the United States tends to focus on threats, but opportunities are an important feature of foreign policy too. Relations with Brazil may suffer from being in a grey zone: it is neither an ally, nor a threat, nor a client.

Current U.S.–Brazil relations recall a similar situation among Atlantic countries—relations between the United States and France mirrored this dynamic in many ways. Both occupied the space of the western liberal democratic country whose revolution was a landmark in the quest for democracy. In the twentieth century, the legacy of France’s loss of empire and international standing, and its discomfort at le défi américain (The American Challenge) to traditional French culture, underpinned a prickly relationship that spanned decades. The United States and France remained NATO allies, but often disagreed on the tactics for advancing their deeply shared values and interests. France’s powerful Foreign Ministry (Quai d’Orsay) and its Brazilian counterpart (Itamaraty) share proud traditions of intellectual leadership in national policymaking—but also a long-standing skepticism of U.S. dominance. France’s return to NATO’s integrated military command enabled a new era of international cooperation, on display during the February 2014 visit of French President François Hollande to the United States. Enhanced cooperation to support peacekeeping could have a similar effect on U.S.–Brazilian relations and be a contribution to international order. Over the decades, France has found ways to cooperate with the United States while retaining its diplomatic independence; and the United States has found ways to coordinate with
France in areas where it has special expertise. The deep network of intellectual and cultural interactions helped both countries understand when a “non” was a disagreement over tactics, and when it was a rejection of U.S. dominance. Similarly, further deepening such links would help U.S.–Brazil relations and their joint efforts to think through the future of international order.

Managing relations with adversaries is important for security, but improving relations among friends enhances well-being and efficient burden-sharing. Deepening economic, social, educational, and cultural links were part of improving the political relationship. These have been important tools in the (north) trans-Atlantic relationship, and would be helpful for U.S.–Brazil relations as well. The two countries conduct a wide range of strategic dialogues. These interactions can help both countries determine ways to contribute to the international order together.

Hosting the World Cup and the Olympics in rapid succession will keep the world’s eyes on Brazil for several years to come. Is Brazil willing to be unpopular? The exercise of soft power is important and attracts partners. Robust leadership also requires making hard choices and occasionally angering friends. Brazil will have to decide if it wants international leadership enough to be unpopular. The United States will have to decide if it is willing to share leadership with a proud and prickly country—one that may be a close friend, but does not want to be an ally.

Notes

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8. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/262 on the “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine” was adopted by a vote of 100 for, 11 against, and 58 abstentions on March 27, 2014.


21. Indeed the newly independent Brazil supported the 1823 U.S. Monroe Doctrine to reduce the influence of Europe in the Americas. In 1824, the United States became the first country to recognize Brazil’s declaration of independence from Portugal. In 1889, the United States was the first country to recognize Brazil’s declaration of a republic and the end of the empire.