What should be the long-term future of the military alliance between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (ROK) after North Korean demilitarization—that is, once North Korea is no longer seen as a serious security threat? Such a situation could result from Korean reunification or confederation, of course, but perhaps more likely is a situation in which the North Korean nuclear threat has been dramatically reduced or eliminated and other aspects of the regime’s military forces and posture have become much less threatening. This question seems very hypothetical and long-term at one level. But the shadow of the future can affect near-term policy debates, especially at a time when the world’s relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are in such flux, and when at least some important elements of strategic thinking in both South Korea and the United States have become very hopeful about the prospects for peace.

This question about the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance cuts to the heart of the purpose of the United States in the international order. Should most American alliances be thought of as permanent, even expanding and growing, structural elements of the global security architecture? Or should they be viewed as temporary phenomena, focused on specific threats when conditions require, but ultimately replaced by more inclusive and multilateral security structures when immediate dangers recede? Or does it all depend? These are questions that a Donald Trump presidency is making more vivid in the United States and around the world today—but they are also matters that predated Trump’s tenure in the White House, and ones that will surely outlast his time there as well.

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There is another variant of this same big question that could become quickly salient in ongoing negotiations over North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction: should the United States be willing to bring American troops home and dissolve the alliance with South Korea in order to achieve North Korean nuclear disarmament? If the alliance is only needed against a North Korean threat, and not necessarily thereafter or otherwise, the answer might be yes, especially if other types of military tensions and dangers can also be reduced as part of any deal. In the spring of 2018, an adviser to President Moon Jae-in suggested the answer to this question might indeed be yes.1 Although the Blue House in Seoul quickly rebutted its own counselor, President Donald Trump subsequently made a similar statement after his June 2018 Singapore meeting with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-Un. Overestimating the official size of the U.S. troop presence in Korea by about 10 percent, Trump declared that “We have right now 32,000 soldiers in South Korea, and I’d like to be able to bring them back home. But that’s not part of the equation right now.”2 Indeed, Chairman Kim’s definition of “denuclearization” of the peninsula may in fact technically require such an end to the U.S. military presence in Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance, if he is to decide that his country should give up the bomb.3 And how should Seoul and Washington react if Kim makes an explicit offer to carry out such a trade, whether in good faith or not?

Thus, questions about the alliance’s long-term desirability are already intersecting with current policy debates and dilemmas. Being flat-footed and giving a wrong answer about the depth of their mutual commitments could be dangerous for leaders in South Korea and the United States. It could lead to tension, perhaps serious public tension, in the alliance —of a type seen in periods like the 1970s and the turn of the century. Even worse, it could potentially echo the infamous 1950 statement by Secretary of State Dean Acheson that South Korea was outside the United States’ core security perimeter—just before North Korea invaded the South that same year. So, while the debate about the alliance’s long-term future after a defusing of the North Korean threat may seem wishful and far ahead of its time at one level, at another level it clearly is not.

Ultimately, this article reaffirms the long-term desirability of the U.S.-ROK military alliance. It also sketches out two possible ways in which American forces in Korea might be restructured after a possible future defusing (or even elimination) of the North Korean threat, based on two different visions about such a future alliance’s core purposes. It bases its main conclusion on four main
arguments. First, having a strong, even predominant, U.S.-led alliance system has been very good for international peace and stability, and the U.S.-ROK alliance has been an integral part of that broader network of alliances since its inception in 1953.

Second, in more specific regional terms, the U.S.-ROK alliance is one of just two key American alliances in Northeast Asia and one of only three strong, formal alliances in the entire Asia-Pacific region. It has considerable regional importance, therefore, even above its role in broader global order and U.S. grand strategy writ large.

Third, in more specific military terms, U.S.-ROK collaboration has been effective regionally and globally, and is likely to remain effective beyond the peninsula in the future as well. South Korea today has the largest military of any American ally, and probably one of the three or four toughest and most combat-capable armed forces. For future security missions ranging from counterterrorism to protection of sea lanes to cyber defense, the alliance can offer great benefits for the United States.

Fourth, Koreans will probably value an alliance with the United States over the longer term for their own security reasons. To be sure, keeping such an alliance could create some strains between Seoul and Beijing in particular. But while Koreans tend to want a good relationship with China, many also worry about being left alone next to a country with 20 times the population and 40 times the size of even a reunified peninsula. Koreans, an extremely impressive people with the world’s 11th largest economy, are too modest when they talk of their country as being a minnow in a sea of sharks and whales (not to mention dragons and bears). But they are right that their country has been at the crossroads of conflict for millennia. They probably will not prefer to seek to preserve their security all by themselves.

Still, on that last issue in particular, no American can settle the debate. So, it is important to delve into more detailed argumentation on each of these points. First though, the article begins with a broader discussion about how to think about alliances in the modern world. Even though I support a long-term U.S.-Korea alliance, there are reasons to question the creation or indefinite continuation of alliances, and we should approach a recommitment to a U.S.-ROK mutual defense agreement from first principles rather than from inertia or pure sentimentalism.

First Things First: What Are Alliances for Anyway?

Even in the absence of a single clear threat like global communism since the Cold War ended, the United States has remained at the core of what is likely the
greatest collection of alliances in world history. Indeed, working with allies, it has even expanded that alliance network, notably in Europe, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has grown from 16 to 29 members. It also has a half dozen allies in East Asia, 10 close security partners (if not formal allies) in the broader Middle East, and a Rio Pact with some 20 countries in the Western Hemisphere. Together, this loosely-defined western alliance system accounts for about two-thirds of world GDP as well as world military spending.⁴

But are all of these alliances unambiguously good things? If so, why do most other major world powers today like Russia, China and India have few if any working military alliances, and why do some proudly neutral countries like Switzerland and Austria seem very content to remain that way? Presumably, for an alliance built against a specific threat (like NATO in the Cold War, or the U.S.-ROK alliance), it is important to ask why such a formal security arrangement should continue even after the initial motivation is gone?

Many international organizations have an obvious logic.⁵ Trade pacts like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), broader and deeper organizations like the European Union (EU), and regional cooperation associations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as most elements of the United Nations (UN) system, focus on specific economic or technical matters where cooperation is generally an unambiguously desirable thing (even if the terms and workings of such organizations can be contentious at times).

By contrast, security organizations are a different matter. They are not inherent to the Westphalian state system or even the post–World War II UN-supervised international order. They are constructs designed to serve particular purposes for specific countries during certain periods. Most have their origins in opposition to some other country or group of countries; they typically have a more zero-sum character than other types of international organization. The effort to organize international society is an ongoing one that involves many different layers of interaction and organization among states, with no clear, predominant role for alliances as the ultimate and central organizing feature of that society.⁶ Alliances may help in some cases; they may be irrelevant or cause damage in others.

It is probably right to believe that the U.S.-led system of alliances that has survived and even thrived since the end of the Cold War is generally stabilizing for the planet. What Bob Kagan calls “the world America made” in his 2012 book by that title has generally been peaceful, at least in terms of great-power relations, and has ushered in the greatest era of improved prosperity in human history.

Some wax wistfully about “balances of power,” as in the Europe state system of

**Balances of power are very hard to make stable and durable.**
old. But the Europe of old was rarely peaceful; balances of power are very hard to make stable and durable. It turns out that uneven balances of power may be more stable, since there is less ambiguity about who would likely win any war, provided that the predominant powers are not bent on conquest themselves. The empirical fact that democracies rarely fight each other has probably helped keep the peace, too. Nuclear deterrence may have added a further restraining influence on state behavior, at least in those regions where it pertains.  

Yet, this basic structure of the global order—most major powers in at least loose alliance with each other, most of them democratic, the United States capable of power projection with conventional forces, and providing a “nuclear umbrella” over allies too—does not necessarily require continual expansion or growth. One need not believe in the concept of offshore balancing or sympathize with isolationism to believe that Washington should be highly selective in which future alliance commitments, if any, it seeks to take on. Because the NATO expansion process in particular has enjoyed such strong bipartisan support since the end of the Cold War, this point is often overlooked in strategy debates. But it is also worth belaboring the obvious: mutual defense organizations involve one or more countries pledging to risk the blood of their own sons and daughters in defense of another people, and usually in combat against a third party. This is not a concept to be taken lightly. 

It is worth remembering that, even though U.S.-backstopped alliances often have a liberal or progressive vision today, their origins were more realist. They were designed to protect key global real estate from an expansionary global communist menace. In the late 1940s, the great statesman and first director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan emphasized the importance to the United States of four areas (in addition to the United States itself, the fifth such crucial center): the United Kingdom, the western European heartland, Japan, and Russia in world politics, arguing that these centers of economic activity and military potential could not be allowed to fall under the control of a single potential adversary. The United States has since devised a grand strategy that places several of these zones, as well as other parts of East Asia and much of the Middle East that are also now crucial to the world economy, within its security system. It is not obvious that a logic like Kennan’s requires either further expansion, or even retaining all existing alliances. Indeed, were U.S. alliance commitments to go too far, their integrity and credibility might be weakened. 

If U.S. alliance commitments go too far, their overall integrity and credibility might be weakened.
might lead to a general lessening in the believability of other core mutual-defense pledges—risking deterrence failure as well as the gradual weakening of the alliance from within. There could be such a thing as overreach, even for a country with as expansive interests, and as impressive a network of overseas alliances, as the United States of America.¹²

Perhaps it is possible to move beyond classic alliances to other types of security structures as well. For example, there were a number of ideas promulgated in the aftermath of the Cold War for new European security architectures based on first principles of international relations and the broad lessons of history.¹³ In Asia, something like the six-party framework that was originally created to guide North Korean nuclear negotiations might be gradually adapted into a fledgling cooperative security structure. One can usefully ask if alliances can complement such efforts or if they inevitably compete with them.

Although the world the United States made has been remarkably stable in terms of great-power relations for most of the last 70 years, it is showing strains today regarding how to handle both China and Russia, to say nothing of Iran and North Korea. More fundamentally, alliances are not always desirable, for the United States or for the regions in which they would be focused. Sometimes, they could overextend American commitments. At other times, they could provoke a strong negative reaction—sometimes even from the domestic politics of the ally in question, or sometimes from other countries in the region. If the latter were bound to be aggressive toward countries of major security concern to the United States anyway, the alliance may produce net good through enhanced deterrence of a menacing potential adversary. But if the creation or sustainment of the alliance itself creates dynamics that raise the risk of war, the idea of alliance may be unsound. And if the potential ally is not sufficiently important strategically to the United States to warrant a mutual-defense pledge, the alliance may simply not make sense for narrow American interests.

It is therefore no surprise that various American strategists have come to different conclusions about the long-term future of the United States’ alliances. Some favor continued expansion; others do not. For many, moreover, given its small size and its distant geographic location, Korea tends to occupy a fairly secondary, and somewhat ambiguous, place in their strategic visions.¹⁴

**Why the U.S.-ROK Alliance Should Endure**

All that said, there are four fundamental arguments that specifically support sustaining a U.S.-ROK alliance despite these more general reasons to be wary of some security partnerships and mutual-defense pacts. Taken together, they make a strong initial case for thinking that the alliance should endure—though of
course, publics, politicians, and strategists in both countries will have to continue
to debate these and other matters to develop the kind of consensus needed to give
any such future alliance staying power.

The first important argument is about global order, and Korea’s role within it.
The second emphasizes Korea’s role in the U.S. system of Asia-Pacific alliances.
Another is based on the military specifics of the U.S.-ROK alliance, most
notably what it brings to the table regionally and globally. The fourth, admittedly
more for Koreans themselves to sort out, concerns the specific geostrategic neigh-
brhood of the Republic of Korea.

First, with the planet’s 11th largest economy, South Korea is quite important in
today’s world. Alliances with such powers are generally worth preserving for the
simple reason that the United States should not want to go back to the kind of
anarchy that prevailed in Europe or East Asia a century ago, when major
powers often had weak and shifting relationships with each other but no real
enduring bonds. The result, of course, was two world wars followed by conflict
in Korea as well.

South Korea is not only the world’s 11th largest economy, but it punches far
above its weight in other ways. It is among the world’s top three producers of
ships, semiconductors, and numerous types of advanced electronics. It is also
the second most powerful country in the Indo-Pacific region overall, after
Japan, with which the United States has a security alliance. Given the dynamism
in the Asia-Pacific region that gave rise to President Obama’s rebalance, or pivot,
and that has been sustained in a number of ways by the Trump administration,
Korea’s role in the U.S. global system of alliances takes on an even more important
character.15

American and Korean publics seem to understand and agree with these obser-
vations. Both countries see the other in a favorable light. Although the tumult of
the past two years has introduced flux into the specific numbers, as of polling done
in 2014, more than 55 percent of Americans thought favorably of South Korea,
and more than 80 percent of South Koreans thought favorably of the United
States. Nearly two-thirds of Americans favored keeping U.S. forces in South
Korea in that same polling, as well.16

Second, in more concrete regional terms, the U.S.-ROK alliance is crucial to
American posture in the broader Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific regions. While
U.S. allies are plentiful around the world, they are most numerous in Europe
and, in different ways, in both Latin America as well as the Middle East. They
are far scarcer in Asia. In terms of fully functional, formal alliances, in fact, the
United States has only three in the Indo-Asia-Pacific—its bilateral relationships
with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia. The U.S. security arrangements
with the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, and Singapore (and, in a different
way, Taiwan) are either less formal politically and diplomatically, or less muscular
militarily, or both. Of the big three allies, only South Korea is part of the Asian land mass. Were this security relationship to weaken significantly or disappear, not only would the United States lose one of three major allies in the region today, it would lose the only foothold it has on the East Asian mainland. Given China’s competitive desires to reduce American influence in Asia, at a time when China and the United States are finding themselves in a more rivalrous relationship writ large, losing not just the ROK as an ally but U.S. military positions on the peninsula as well could be a serious setback for the United States. Such a strategic landscape might also allow China to concentrate its military energies even more on maritime regions, potentially increasing the pressure it could place on Japan and Australia, among others.\textsuperscript{17}

Third, in more specific military terms, the U.S.-ROK alliance has proven its mettle, not only on the Korean peninsula but from Vietnam to the Middle East and beyond. The United States has more than 60 allies and security partners. But of those, arguably only Great Britain, Australia, and perhaps Canada and France have shown the same commitment to collaborative global military operations with the United States, combined with the same mass and fighting capability, as South Korea has demonstrated.

\begin{quote}
South Korea today has the largest military of any American ally.
\end{quote}

Indeed, although it is streamlining the size of its armed forces at present, South Korea today has the largest military of any American ally.\textsuperscript{18} It probably has one of the three or four toughest and most combat-ready armed forces in the world. It ranks fifth in military spending among formal U.S. allies (sixth if one counts Saudi Arabia). Leaving aside U.S. security partners in the broader Middle East, none of which are formal allies, South Korea also is at the top of the list for burdensharing among American allies. It devotes some 2.5 percent of GDP to its military—the most of any U.S. ally in East Asia, Europe, or the Americas with the exception of Colombia (and Trinidad and Tobago)—well in excess of NATO’s goal of 2 percent, which is admittedly not a formal goal for other allies, yet still a useful reference point. For future security missions ranging from counterterrorism to protection of sea lanes to cyber defense, the alliance offers great benefits for the United States.

During the Vietnam War, South Korea maintained two combat divisions in support of American combat operations for an extended period of time. In recent years, South Korea has deployed a mechanized infantry battalion to the UN mission in Lebanon, an engineering company in South Sudan, and a special forces training contingent in the United Arab Emirates, among other efforts abroad. It also sustains a small contribution to the U.S.-led international
mission in Afghanistan, where it had once deployed several hundred troops at the height of the “surge” there. It has a reasonably large navy with some two dozen major surface combatants, as well as mine warfare ships and some amphibious capability. Many of these forces could be used as part of larger multilateral operations elsewhere, especially if freed up from current pressing responsibilities on the Korean peninsula itself.19

Fourth, there is the matter of South Korea’s own immediate security—and most of all, its relationship with China. Over the past three decades, the ROK and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have become very important economic and diplomatic partners. Indeed, on matters of how to handle North Korea, they often align at least as much with each other as either does with Washington. Thus, there are elements of harmony in the current relationship that many elements within the South Korean polity, especially but not only on the left, would seek to preserve and enhance.

These happy considerations are reinforced by sober calculations in South Korea about size, power, and threat. Even a reunified Korea would have only 5 percent of the population of China. From that perspective, the PRC is not an enemy Koreans can afford to have. In this light, the United States has sometimes been too quick to try to draw Seoul into its broader disputes with China, notably over Taiwan, such as when the George W. Bush administration requested “strategic flexibility” so that it might have advance permission to use American forces based in Korea for combat operations in the broader region. More generally, the United States needs to appreciate South Korea’s strategic circumstances toward China, which are clearly not the same as its own toward China, or even particularly similar to Japan’s.20

Yet, if South Koreans want to get along with—and are careful about angering—China, many also have a certain fear about their giant northwestern neighbor. Put simply, China is probably not a country most Koreans would prefer to have to trust and deal with on their own. Notably over the past decade, South Korean favorability toward China has averaged slightly less than 50 percent in polls, twice dropping below 40 percent after disputatious periods.21 In ancient times, some Chinese dynasties included land from the Korean peninsula within their perimeters, raising a latent worry among some Koreans that China could be a threat again. Korea was viewed in Beijing as a tributary state for centuries. It has also often experienced conflict, given its location at the nexus between zones of Japanese, Russian, and Chinese hegemony, for centuries as well.22 Recently, the dispute over a U.S. THAAD missile deployment to South Korea, which led to Chinese economic retaliation against South Korean companies and citizens, was a stark reminder that China is not always purely a friend to the Korean people.

And of course, while China may be the greatest regional concern for Koreans, it is not the only one. Japan continues to claim islands also claimed by Seoul. Korean
views toward Japan remain wary after the brutal occupation from 1910 until 1945, and Tokyo has had difficulties in consistently and sincerely atoning for that tragic period, as Jennifer Lind explains masterfully in her *Sorry States* tome. Some kind of alliance with the United States would thus likely help reassure Koreans about their future security in their own neighborhood for multiple reasons. Even though, as acknowledged above, this last major argument in favor of a long-term U.S.-ROK alliance is one the Korean people must think through themselves. This article can only help spark a debate—a debate that should happen soon.

**Missions and U.S. Force Postures for a Future Alliance**

If the North Korea threat can someday be defused to the point where it no longer need constitute the military focal point for planners in Seoul and Washington, how might the U.S.-ROK alliance—and any future U.S. military force presence on the peninsula—be redefined? It is somewhat conjectural to consider this latter question, and too soon to worry about precise answers. But consideration of some broad concepts and rough numbers can help round out the earlier strategic discussion about a future alliance’s basic desirability and purpose, to make concrete analysis that may otherwise seem abstract. It can also begin to suggest how Seoul and Washington might talk with Beijing, Pyongyang, and other capitals about the subject if and when it comes up—to convey the proper mix of reassurance and resoluteness.

I begin with the assumption that to help underwrite the security of an exposed ally in a challenging security environment, the United States should base at least some forces permanently in that country. Of course, this premise can be challenged and debated. But the arguments in support of a permanent military presence are very strong. U.S. alliances that were not undergirded by permanent basing have often not stood the test of time or crisis—or of crisis conditions—think of Pakistan, when it was a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the early Cold War decades in its various fights with India, or of the close U.S. security partner Israel in its wars with Arab states. Washington did not send combat troops in support of either country in times of crisis. Of course, the United States may not have wished to put forces on these countries’ territories in those earlier times—but the choice not to do so was motivated, at least in part, precisely out of a desire to avoid an entanglement it might not
want. For a close ally with similar values and a strong record of cooperation, like the Republic of Korea, it would be far preferable to give an enduring alliance some real skeletal tissue and muscle. Doing so would also avoid “singularizing” Japan as the only Northeast Asian country hosting U.S. forces, leaving Korea in the position of the less-preferred step-cousin.

Today, the United States has some 28,500 uniformed service members assigned to posts in Korea. Some 19,000 are soldiers, almost 9,000 are U.S. Air Force personnel. There are modest numbers of Navy, Marine Corps, and special forces personnel as well, largely for purposes of advance planning, training, logistics coordination, and preparation for absorbing an incoming U.S. force that could exceed 300,000 GIs in the event of war.23

That 28,500 figure is down from some 60,000 in the early Cold War decades and some 40,000 in the 1980s and 1990s.24 The biggest change since the Cold War ended, in terms of numbers of U.S. troops, resulted from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s decision to pull one of the two U.S. Army brigades normally deployed to South Korea off the peninsula and instead involve it in the rotation base for forces being sent to Iraq and Afghanistan. The other big changes since the end of the Cold War in terms of force posture and disposition were, first, to remove U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea during the George H.W. Bush presidency, and second, to relocate most U.S. ground forces southward, from positions in Seoul and north of Seoul near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to a giant base called Camp Humphries. The Army presence centers around a mechanized infantry brigade but also has large contingents focused on air and missile defense, long-range counterartillery detection and artillery fire, battlefield mobility, and logistics preparation for any massive reinforcement. The Air Force presence is primarily at the Kunsan and Osan bases—like Humphries, below Seoul, but also in the country’s northwest, the former on the Yellow Sea coast and the latter somewhat inland. These capabilities center on tactical combat forces that would be crucial in early attacks against North Korean artillery and missile launchers, and in subsequent efforts to mount a joint counteroffensive against the DPRK.

Looking to a future peninsula, two different concepts are straightforward to imagine. One would be built on a variant of today’s strategic logic of territorial defense. The other would be more multilateral, regional, and expeditionary in character; it would also probably be much smaller. To be more specific, a first option for future U.S. military posture in Korea would be, in effect, a modestly scaled-back version of today’s 28,500 American GIs on the peninsula, along with the potential to add hundreds of thousands...
more for the direct defense of the Republic of Korea. In effect, under this scenario, a hypothetical China threat would replace today’s very real North Korean threat for military planning purposes. The United States would retain something like the current mix of U.S. units—a brigade of heavy Army forces, additional ground-logistics capabilities, two wings of Air Force fighter and attack aircraft—as well as facilities in the country’s southeast to bring in huge reinforcements in the event of war. U.S. uniformed personnel might total around 20,000 to 25,000 in peacetime. If the peninsula were reunified, some of these U.S. forces might be moved northward—though then again, they might not be, if Seoul and Washington determined that it would be better for their longer-term relationship with Beijing not to station any Americans north of today’s DMZ.\(^{25}\)

The other basic option would be smaller, perhaps 5,000 to 10,000 GIs. It would not emphasize a Chinese invasion threat, but rather binational or multinational expeditionary operations throughout the region and globe.\(^{26}\) Most of today’s American fighter aircraft in Korea, with their relatively short ranges, might return to the United States, as would logistics capabilities designed to bring in more than 300,000 additional GIs in the event of war. The heavy Army brigade now in Korea might be transformed into a light brigade, and based at a new regional peacekeeping center somewhere in Korea where other nations (even China) could also send forces to train. American special operations forces would remain in modest numbers for missions like counterrorism the two countries could conduct together. Some U.S. Navy ships might be located in Korea too. Perhaps Seoul and Washington could create a center of excellence for ships employing robotics and artificial intelligence (given Korea’s excellent capacities in broad areas of electronics and cyber, and expected successes in AI, as well).

We do not need to answer all these questions now. But it is not too soon to start the debate; indeed, Trump, and some members of the South Korean government, have arguably started it already. And it is definitely not too soon to oppose any possible North Korean demand that we end the U.S.-ROK alliance, or promise to do so by some specific point in the future, in order to do a nuclear deal. The U.S.-ROK has a durable logic, built on the mutual interests of the two countries that extend well beyond deterring North Korea, in time and space. Indeed, as a pillar of international stability, that alliance is one of the United States’, and Korea’s, most prized assets—threatening to none, and beneficial to all, whether they always acknowledge and understand it or not. The U.S.-led democratic alliance system is probably the most structurally important, and sound, underpinning of today’s twenty-first century global order, and within that broader community, it is hard to find a stronger element than the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance.
Endnotes


3. See, for example, quote of Bruce Klingner in, “North Korea Puts Denuclearization on the Negotiating Table: Is It a Breakthrough or Stalling Tactic?,” PBS NewsHour, March 6, 2018, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/north-korea-puts-denuclearization-on-the-negotiating-table-is-it-a-breakthrough-or-stalling-tactic.


17. For an elegant articulation of these views, see comments of Michael J. Green, “Reimagining the U.S.-South Korea Alliance,” Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., August 22, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/events/reimagining-the-u-s-south-korea-alliance.


